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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND NONSTATUTORY
REVIEW OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION: SOME CONCLUSIONS FROM
THE PUBLIC-LANDS CASES
Antonin Scalia*
is the inherited wisdom of the American bar that responsible
professional comment and criticism are the principal restraints
upon judicial arbitrariness at the highest level and major influences
in the continuing development of court-made law. If there is one
legal development (or, perhaps more accurately, nondevelopment)
found in the pages of the United States reports during the present
century which would cause the most credulous observer to doubt
the truth of this axiom, it is the continued good health of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Since the end of the last century, learned
members of the legal profession have been continuously attacking
the roots and branches of that judicially planted growth,1 calling
into question not only its utility but even the legitimacy of its
alleged origins.2 Oddly enough, this criticism has had a palpable
effect upon federal legislators,3 who, according to our agreed-upon
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The writing of this Article was made possible by a summer research grant from the
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1. E.g., Davie, Suing the State, 18 AM. L. R.Ev. 814 (1884); Freund, Private Claims
Against the State, 8 Pox.. SCI. Q. 625, 638-40 (1893); Moore, Liability for Acts of Public
Servants, 23 L.Q. R.Ev. 12 (1907); Laski, The Responsibility of the State in England,
32 HARV. L. REV. 447 (1919); Barry, The King Can Do No Wrong, 11 VA. L. R.Ev. 349
(1925); Borchard, State and Municipal Liability in Tort, 20 A.B.A.J. 747 (1934) {containing bibliography of earlier works); Block, Suits Against Government Officers and
the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 59 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1060 (1946); Comment, The Sovereign Immunity Doctrine and Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 2
UCLA L. R.Ev. 382 (1955); Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial
Review: Sovereign Immunity, Indispensable Parties, .Mandamus, 75 HARV. L. R.Ev.
1479 (1962). In 1925, an observer noted that there was "a growing army of modem
critics" of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Angell, Sovereign Immunity-The
Modern Trend, 35 YALE L.J. 150, 151 (1925). By 1958, that army's ranks had swelled
to such a degree that, according to one of the most knowledgeable scholars of the
field, "nearly every commentator who considers the subject vigorously asserts that the
doctrine of sovereign immunity must go." 3 K. DAVIS, .ADlllINISrRATIVE LAW TREATISE
435 (1958).
2. See, e.g., Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 17-41
(1926).
3. The first broad congressional waiver of sovereign immunity came in 1855 with
the Court of Claims Act, 10 Stat. 612, which was later extended in some respects by
the Tucker Act, 24 Stat. 505, 506 (1887) (both now codified in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.). The other sweeping waiver was the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, 60 Stat.
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notions of the legal process, are supposed to be moved not by learned
articles but by lobbies and ballot boxes; it has also had its influence,
particularly noticeable in very recent years, upon state supreme
courts. 4 But if the United States Supreme Court is to be judged by
what it has done concerning the doctrine, as opposed to what it has
from time to time said, 5 criticism seems to have confirmed the Court
in the error of its ways. Not only has there been no judicial elimination of the doctrine of sovereign immunity as it applies to the federal government, but recently the scope of the doctrine has in some
important respects been extended beyond what it was in 1882.6
842 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). There have been numerous waivers of
more limited scope, such as the Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 423, 36 Stat. 851, as amended,
28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1964) (permitting suit against the United States for patent infringe•
ment); the Public Vessels Act, 43 Stat. 1112 (1925), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-90
(1964) (permitting libel in admiralty against the United States); the Act of May 24,
1938, 52 Stat. 438, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1495 (1964) (permitting suit against the
United States for imprisonment upon unjust conviction); and the Act of November 2,
1966, 26 U.S.C. § 7426 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968) (enabling suit against the United States by
a person who claims an interest in property which has been levied upon to secure payment of someone else's tax). In addition to such statutes, which were enacted for the
specific purpose of permitting suit, numerous statutes enacted primarily to create or
regulate federal agencies authorize suit to review such agencies' actions or determinations. E.g., Federal Trade Commission Act, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1964); Securities
Exchange Act § 25, 15 U.S.C. § 78y (1964); National Labor Relations Act § lO(f), 29
U.S.C. § 160(f) (1964). See Developments in the Law-Remedies Against the United
States and Its Officials, 70 HARV. L. REv. 827, 904 n.524 (1957). The Supreme Court has
recognized that elimination of immunity is the "trend of congressional policy" [Keifer
8: Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 375, 397 (1939)] and the "steady legis•
lative trend" [National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 360 (1955)].
4. A number of state supreme courts have abolished the doctrine of state immunity
from tort liability. E.g., Stone v. Arizona Highway Commn., 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107
(1963); Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, 259 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89
(1961). In some such jurisdictions, the legislatures have intervened to reinstate at least
a portion of the immunity. See, e.g., the Illinois statutes referred to in Harvey v. Clyde
Park Dist., 32 Ill. 2d 60, 62-63, 203 N.E.2d 573, 574-75 (1965). See generally Lawyer,
Birth and Death of Governmental Immunity, 15 CLEV.·MAR. L. REv. 529 (1966).
5. Most prophetic of change was the following excerpt from National City Bank v.
Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 359-60 (1955):
[T]he immunity enjoyed by the United States as territorial sovereign is a
legal doctrine whicli has not been favored by the test of time. It has increasingly
been found to be in conflict with the growing subjection of governmental action
to the moral judgment. A reflection of this steady shift in attitude toward the
American sovereign's immunity is found in ••• observations in unanimous opinions of this Court •.•• This chilly feeling against sovereign immunity began to
reflect itself in federal legislation in 1797 •.•• [A]menability to suit has become
a commonplace in regard to the various agencies which carry out "the enlarged
scope of government in economic affairs,'' ••• The substantive sweep of amena•
bility to judicial process has likewise grown apace.
The outlook and feeling thus reflected are not merely relevant to our problem.
They are important. The claims of dominant opinion rooted in sentiments of
justice and public morality are among the most powerful shaping-forces in law•
making by courts. Legislation and adjudication are interacting influences in the
development of law. A steady legislative trend, presumably manifesting a strong
social policy, properly makes demands on the judicial process.
6. Compare Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 64~ (1962), with United States v. Lee,
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During most of the nineteenth century, the area in which the
doctrine of federal sovereign immunity made its most blatant affront
to the basic precepts of justice was that of contract law. After its
ill effects in that particular area had been substantially eliminated by
passage of the Tucker Act in 1887,7 criticism of the doctrine tended
to dwell upon its manifestations in the field of torts. 8 That field
in tum having been largely reformed by the Federal Tort Claims
Act of 1946,9 discussion of federal immunity during the past
twenty-five years has tended to focus upon the doctrine's application to the expanding and increasingly important field of administrative law-that is, upon the extent to which sovereign immunity
prevents judicial control or correction of improper administrative
action.10 More specifically, recent concern has centered on the man106 U.S. 196 (1882). To all intelligent observers this development has been incredible
in the conventionally hyperbolic sense. To at least one it has been quite literally
beyond belief; see the enlightening and entertaining article by Kenneth Culp Davis,
Suing the Government by Falsely Pretending To Sue an Officer, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 435
(1962). In this essay, appearing in the Spring issue of the cited publication, Professor
Davis has the following to say about Larson v. Domestic &: Foreign Commerce Corp.•
!137 U.S. 682 (1949), the case which clearly enunciated a new and expanded concept of
sovereign immunity: "In the long run, the Larson attitude cannot survive. It is sure
to be superseded by the good sense of cases like [Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535
(1959)]." Id. at 456. Two pages later, near the end of the article-where it was
doubtless inserted after the publication had gone to press-there appears the following poignant footnote, somehow conveying, even in its law review terseness, a disbelief
only strengthened by repeated demonstration of the absurd:
In Malone v. Bowdoin, 30 U.S.L.W. 4311 (U.S. May 14, 1962) (No. 113), the Supreme Court, five to two, not only followed the Larson decision but expanded
the application of its doctrine. The Court, however, rested its decision solely on
the authority of the Larson case, without a reexamination of its soundness or
unsoundness, and it explicitly acknowledged "the seemingly conflicting precedents."
Id. at 458 n.79. As the reader may gather from the repeated reliance upon Professor
Davis' writings in this Article, the foregoing tale is not recounted in deprecation of
that eminent scholar's work, nor even of his prophetic powers, which will yet, hopefully, be vindicated. It is precisely because he is one of the most acute observers
that his reaction to Larson demonstrates the genuine incredibility of the Court's recent
actions in this field.
7. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (now codified in scattered sections of
28 U.S.C.).
8. In addition to the works from the relevant period cited in note 1 supra, see
Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (pts. 1-3), 34 YALE L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-1925),
Governmental Responsibility in Tort (pts. 4-6), 36 YALE L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-1927).
9. Act of Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, tit, IV, 60 Stat. 842 {now codified in scattered sections
of 28 U.S.C.).
10. The important article which pointed the new direction was published the
month after Congress finally passed the Federal Tort Claims Act: Block, Suits Against
Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 59 HARv. L. REv. 1060
(1946). Subsequent literature includes Walkup, Immunity of the State from Suit by the
Citizens-Toward a .More Enlightened Concept, 36 GEO. L.J. 310, 542 (1948); Note,
The Dollar Litigation: A Study in Sovereign Immunity, 65 HARV, L. REv. 466 (1952);
Comment, The Sovereign Immunity Doctrine and Judidal Review of Federal Administrative Action, 2 UCLA L. R.Ev. 382 (1955); Note, Sovereign Immunity and
Specific Relief Against Federal Officers, 55 CoLUM. L. REv. 73 (1955); Carrow, Sovereign

870

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 68:867

ner in which sovereign immunity affects "nonstatutory review" of
federal administrative action.11 That quoted phrase refers to the type
of review of administrative action which is available, not by virtue
of those explicit review provisions contained in most modern statutes
which create administrative agencies, but rather through the use of
traditional common-law remedies-most notably, the ·writ of mandamus and the injunction-against the officer who is allegedly misapplying his statutory authority or exceeding his constitutional
power. 12 These remedies gave rise to what Professor Jaffe has aptly
called the "common law of judicial review." 13
Immunity in Administrative Law-A New Diagnosis, 9 J. PUB. L. 1 (1960); Davis,
supra note 6. Of course, treatises devoted to administrative law have necessarily con•
sidered the problem. E.g., 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 27.01-.05
(1958); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 197-231 (1965).
. 11. See Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review (pts. 1·2), 71 HARV. L. REv. 401, 769
(1958); Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review: Sovereign
Immunity, Indispensable Parties, Mandamus, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1479 (1962); Byse &:
Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and "Nonstatutory"
Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 HARV. L. REv 308 (1967). That
contemporary criticism of federal sovereign immunity continues to focus primarily
upon its effects on administrative law is demonstrated by the fact that the most
recent proposal for statutory abolition of the doctrine has emanated from the Administrative Conference of the United States. An excellent discussion of those effects and
that proposal is contained in Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative
Action: The Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68 MICH, L. R.Ev. 387 (1970).
12. It has been noted that the phrase "nonstatutory review" is imprecise. All actions
in federal courts are, strictly speaking, statutory. So-called "nonstatutory review" pro•
ceedings are, more accurately, those which are brought under statutes of general applicability, as opposed to statutes specifically designed to enable judicial review of the
actions of a particular agency or agencies. For example, a common type of nonstatutory proceeding is the suit for injunction, brought under the "federal question"
provision and the "all writs" provision of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1651
(1964)-provisions which may support suit against an official of any federal agency or
indeed against private citizens. Such a nonstatutory proceeding may be contrasted with a
"statutory review" proceeding under 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1964), a provision which sets
forth in some detail the procedure for obtaining judicial review of a cease-and-desist
order issued by the Federal Trade Commission. Thus, the provision of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964), giving district courts "original
jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee
of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff,"
does not remove such actions from the category of "nonstatutory review" proceedings.
As so understood, the phrase, despite its imprecision, has distinct utility. See Fuchs,
Judicial Control of Administrative Agencies in Indiana, 21 !ND, L.J. I, 11 (1952).
13. The Right to Judicial Review, 71 HARv. L. REv. 401, 410 (1958). I do not mean
to imply that this "common law of judicial review" has application, at the present
time, only to nonstatutory review proceedings. On the contrary, the principles which
it developed with respect to the scope of review and many other matters are used to
fill the numerous interstices which any statutory-review provision contains. Still less
do I mean to imply that what are now called the methods of "nonstatutory review"
have always been regarded so forthrightly as devices for providing judicial control of
administrative action. Until very recent times, the assertion that a suit was brought in
order to obtain review of an administrative determination was meant and understood
as an assertion that the suit ought to be dismissed. See, e.g., In re Emblen, 161 U.S.
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Those articles which set out to explain the effect of sovereign
immunity upon nonstatutory review demonstrate, often intentionally
but sometimes not, that the matter truly surpasseth human understanding-even as the Supreme Court itself has delicately indicated
on more than one occasion.14 The purpose of the present Article is
52, 55 (1896) ("This is an attempt to use a writ of mandamus to the Secretary of the
Interior as a writ of error to review his acts, and to draw into the jurisdiction of the
courts matters which are within the exclusive cognizance of the Land Department.');
Lane v. Watts, 234 U.S. 525, 540 (1914) ("This disposes of the contentions of appellants
that ••• the suit is an attempted direct appeal from the decision of the Interior Department ••• .'); United States ex rel. Hall v. Lane, 48 App. D.C. 279, 284, affd. sub nom.
United States ex rel. Hall v. Payne, 254- U.S. 343 (1920) ("[I]£ we admit [that the appellant has a right to a writ of mandamus in this case], it must be on the assumption
that this court has the power to review the decision of the Secretary of the Interior
upon an application for such a writ. But it does not possess that power, for it is familiar
law that 'the writ [of mandamus] never can be used as a substitute for a writ of
error.' '). It is interesting to compare this view with the opinions of modern courts,
which not only recognize that review of administrative action is the genuine and
thoroughly permissible object of these proceedings, but sometimes have their eyes fixed
so clearly upon that object that they omit any reference whatever to the technical
character of the suit through which it is pursued (e.g., petition for mandamus, declaratory judgn1ent, or action for review under the Administrative Procedure Act). For
example, in Robertson v. Udall, 349 F.2d 195 (D.C. Cir. 1965), the court's only description of the nature of the proceeding is as follows:
The district court granted appellee's motion for summary judgment in this
action, which we think must be taken to be a suit to review, on the basis of the
administrative record, a decision of the Secretary of the Interior to reject certain
lease offers as not in compliance with the applicable regnlations.
349 F.2d at 196. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit habitually
describes nonstatutory review proceedings in such terms, sometimes with no other
indication as to the precise character of the suit. See, e.g., Duesing v. Udall, 350 F.2d
748 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 912 (1966); Lord v. Helmandollar, 348 F.2d 780,
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 928 (1965); McNeil v. Udall, 340 F.2d 801 (1964), cert denied, 381
U.S. 904 (1965). Nor does the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stand
alone in the practice. See, e.g., Harvey v. Udall, 384 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1967) (only
description of the nature of the action: "This action seeks to overturn the Secretary of
the Interior's rejection of appellant's offer for an oil and gas lease • • • • This court
has the right to review under Section IO of the Administrative Procedure Act .•• .');
Hendriksen v. Udall, 350 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 940 (1966)
(only description of the nature of the action: "This is an appeal from a grant of
summary judgment ••• , the effect of which was to uphold appellee's decision denying
appellants' application for a land patent ••• .').
14. Indeed, the Court seems never to tire of doing so:
And it must be confessed that, in regard to [cases involving both state and
federal sovereign immunity], the questions raised have rarely been free from
difficulty, and the judges of this court have not always been able to agree in regard
to them. Nor is it an easy matter to reconcile all the decisions of the court in
this class of cases.
Cunningham v. Macon &: B. R.R., 109 U.S. 446, 451 (1883).
As this Court remarked nearly sixty years ago respecting questions of this kind,
they "have rarely been free from difficulty" and it is not "an easy matter to reconcile all the decisions of the court in this class of cases." The statement applies
with equal force at this day.
Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354, 359 (194-1).
We say the foregoing [sovereign immunity] cases are distinguishable from the
present one, though as a matter of logic it is not easy to reconcile all of them.
Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (194-7).
There are a great number of [cases following United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196
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not to propose yet another route toward logical reconciliation of the
sovereign-immunity cases; but, on the contrary, to urge general acceptance of the fact that such reconciliation is, and will probably remain, unattainable; to explain why this is so; and to suggest why
it is not so bad. This modest goal will be attempted through a detailed examination of two recent Supreme Court cases and their
most pertinent antecedents.
J. THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

A. The Malone Case

Malone v. Bowdoin15 was an ejectment action against a Forest
Service Officer of the United States Department of Agriculture,
commenced in a Georgia state court and removed to a federal court.10
Insofar as appeared from the facts brought forward in the course of the
litigation, the chain of title under which the United States claimed
(1882)] and, as this Court has itself remarked, it is not "an easy matter to recon•
cile all the decisions of the court in this class of cases." [The Court's footnote at
this point cites Cunningham, supra, and then observes that "The ensuing years
have not made the task less difficult.'1
Larson v. Domestic 8: Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 698 (1949).
While it is possible to differentiate many of these [sovereign immunity] cases
upon their individualized facts, it is fair to say that to reconcile completely all
the decisions of the Court in this field prior to 1949 would be a Procrustean task.
Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 646 (1962).
15. 369 U.S. 643 (1962).
16. Removal was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1964). In addition to service upon the
officer, there had been an attempted service upon the United States by the mailing of
copies of the petition to the Attorney General. Both parties conceded, however, in the
trial court and in the court of appeals, "that the United States was not legally before
the court and that the action against it should be dismissed." Bowdoin v. Malone,
284 F.2d 95, 96 (5th Cir. 1960). This dismissal was not challenged in the Supreme
Court, 396 U.S. at 643 n.1, and hence the opinion does not concern the applicability
of the doctrine of sovereign immunity to suits brought against the United States in
form as well as in substance. It seems clear, however, that even when that doctrine
does not bar a suit against a federal officer to restrain or compel federal action, it docs
bar a suit formally against the United States for the same purpose. See, e.g., Chournos
v. United States, 335 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1964); McEachern v. United States, 321 F.2d lH
(4th Cir. 1963); Zager v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 396 (E.D. Wis. 1966). But see Coleman v. United States, 363 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1966), afjd. on rehearing, 379 F.2d 555
(1967), revd. on other grounds, 390 U.S. 599 (1968), in which a judgment was initially
rendered against the United States eo nomine in order to set aside the invalidation of
mining claims by the Secretary of the Interior. The judgment was upon a counterclaim,
since the suit had been initiated by the United States; but that fact should have made
no difference with respect to the sovereign-immunity point. See note 210 infra. The
court of appeals managed to correct the bizarre result prior to the rehearing, by the
device of entering "an order inviting Stewart L. Udall, Secretary of the Interior, to
move to join as a counterclaim defendant and appellee." 379 F.2d at 556. That invitation was-to the court's great relief, one suspects-duly accepted, and the motion was
then granted.
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to be the owner in fee of the land in question included a purported
grant of the fee by a person, subsequently deceased, who had possessed
only a life estate; the plaintiffs claimed to be the remaindermen.
Upon removal, the defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that
"the court has no jurisdiction over Malone since the proceeding is in
substance and effect against the United States and that the United
States has not consented to be sued or waived its immunity from
suit."17 The federal district court granted the motion,18 but the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed,19 relying principally upon the old and famous case of United States v.
Lee.20
That case had also been an ejectment action, brought against federal agents by the widow of General Robert E. Lee. The General's
Arlington estate had been seized during the Civil War for nonpayment of taxes and was at the time of suit being used as a federal
fort and cemetery. The taxes had in fact been tendered by a friend
of Lee, but the tax authorities had interpreted the laws as permitting
payment only by the owner of record. The trial court found for the
plaintiff, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding explicitly that
the doctrine of sovereign immunity posed no obstacle to suit.
The Lee case would have provided irrefutable authority in Malone,
had it not been for the doubts cast upon its continued validity by
Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Corporation. 21 In Larson, suit was
brought against the Administrator of the War Assets Administration
by a company which claimed that it had purchased from the Administration surplus coal which the Administrator had refused to deliver
and had instead contracted to sell to others. The complaint sought
both an injunction against sale or delivery to any other person and
a declaration that the sale to the plaintiff was valid and the sale to
the second purchaser void. The trial court dismissed the suit on
the ground of sovereign immunity, but the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed. 22 The Supreme Court,
in an opinion written by Chief Justice Vinson, used the case as an
occasion to "resolve the conflict in doctrine" posed by the existence
of "only one possible exception" to the steady principle which governed and explained all the cases seeking specific relief in connec17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Doe v. Roe, 186 F. Supp. 407 (M.D. Ga. 1959).
186 F. Supp. at 408.
Bowdoin v. Malone, 284 F.2d 95, 98-105 (1960).
106 U.S. 196 (1882).
337 U.S. 682 (1949).
Domestic&: Foreign Commerce Corp. v. Littlejohn, 165 F.2d 235 (1947).
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tion with property held or interfered with by federal officers.2a That
steady principle was, according to the Court's opinion, that
the action of an officer of the sovereign (be it holding, taking or otherwise legally affecting the plaintiff's property) can be regarded as so
"illegal" as to permit a suit for specific relief against the officer as an
individual only if it is not within the officer's statutory powers or, if
within those powers, only if the powers, or their exercise in the particular case, are constitutionally void.2 4
The Court in Larson went on to suggest, in a footnote, that even
ultra vires or unconstitutional action may not suffice to avoid the
bar of sovereign immunity "if the relief requested can not be granted
by merely ordering the cessation of the conduct complained of but
will require affirmative action l;>y the sovereign or the disposition of
unquestionably sovereign property."25 The Lee case was explained
on the ground that at the time of that decision there had been no
other remedy available to compensate the plaintiff for the taking of
the land, and thus the tiling had been unconstitutional, whereas in
Larson there was admittedly a remedy for breach of contract in the
Court of Claims.26 Only three Justices joined with Chief Justice
Vinson in the majority opinion. Justice Rutledge concurred solely
in the result, and Justice Douglas wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he maintained that "the principles announced by the
Court are the ones which should govern the selling of government
property."21 Justice Jackson dissented without opinion, and Justice
23. 337 U.S. at 698, 701. The one case which the Court was willing to allow as a
"possible exception" to the admirable uniformity was Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U.S. 536
(1926). Even that case was, according to the Court, an exception only in theory, and
perhaps not in factual outcome.
24, 337 U.S. at 701-02. It is interesting to compare this principle with that which
had been proposed by an article in the Harvard Law Review less than three years
earlier:
In those cases in which it is alleged that the defendant officer is proceeding
under an unconstitutional statute or in excess of his statutory authority, the interest in the protection of the plaintiff's right to be free from the consequences
of such action outweighs the interest served by the sovereign immunity doctrine .
• • • On the other hand, where no substantial claim is made that the defendant
officer is acting pursuant to an unconstitutional enactment or in excess of his
statutory authority, the pUipose of the sovereign immunity doctrine requires dis•
missal of the suit for want of jurisdiction.
Block, Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 59
HARV, L. REv. 1060, 1080-81 (1946). Curiously, the article is cited by Justice Frankfurter in his dissent in Larson, 337 U.S. at 715 n.6, but not by the majority opinion.
Yet the Court cannot be accused of lack of originality, for whereas Block's article
brought forward this solution as a proposed reform, the Court presented it as a description of past practice-leading one to surmise that even if the majority had heard
of Block's proposed reform, they would have dismissed it out of hand by observing
that "the cure is the same as the disease."
25. 337 U.S. at 691 n.11.
26. 337 U.S. at 703 n.27.
27. 337 U.S. at 705.
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Frankfurter, joined by Justice Burton, dissented in an exhaustive
opinion which, whether or not it demonstrates the correctness of
Justice Frankfurter's theory of sovereign immunity, suffices to convince even the most casual reader that the "ultra vires-unconstitutional" test as the sole criterion of justiciability is, even if correct,
at least newly discovered and certainly subject to contradiction by
the reasoning of more than one previous Supreme Court decision. The
lower federal courts,28 no less than the commentators,29 had some
difficulty taking Larson seriously, not only because of the novelty
of its pronouncements and their contradiction of earlier precedents,
but also because the Court's opinion had been subscribed to by
only a minority of its members.
The opinion of the court of appeals in Malone was a clear reflection of that skepticism concerning the vitality of Larson,30 and the
basic question before the Supreme Court in .Malone was whether to
stand by or reject that earlier case. The decision was to stand by it,
and the judgment of the court of appeals was accordingly reversed. 31
The Court held that even if the plaintiff was the owner, as he alleged,
he could not recover possession of his land; the trespassing federal officers were acting within the scope of their authority, even though
mistakenly, and the availability of monetary compensation in the
Court of Claims prevented the taking from being unconstitutional. 32

B. The Tallman Case
A recent case with which Jl.1alone invites comparison is Udall v.
Tallman,83 described by the Supreme Court as "an action in the
28. In McKay v. Wahlenmaier, 226 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1955), Larson was not even
mentioned in the majority opinion, although it was cited as controlling by Judge
Washington's dissent. In California v. Rank, 293 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1961), Larson was
discussed but distinguished "on grounds which seem flimsy." Davis, supra note 6, at 456
n.77.
29. E.g., Davis, supra note 6, at 454-58; Carrow, supra note IO, at 12-13; Jaffe,
supra note 13, at 434-35.
30. Davis, supra note 6, at 456:
The court disparaged the Larson case in various ways-by emphasizing that only
four Justices concurred in the majority opinion, by paying tribute to the dissenting opinion, by showing that some of the majority in Larson had joined in the
Dolla1· decision, and by following the Lee case after asserting that the Larson
opinion "is susceptible of being construed as questioning some of the fundamental
bases of Lee."
31. The decision ,was 5-2, with Justice Harlan joining in Justice Douglas' dissent,
and Justices Frankfurter and White not participating.
32. Significantly, perhaps, the Court at no point in its full discussion of the
sovereign immunity doctrine made any reference to the additional limitation upon
the granting of affirmative relief which had been asserted in footnote 11 of the
Larson opinion. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
33. 380 U.S. I (1965).
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nature of mandamus ... to compel the Secretary [of the Interior]
to issue oil and gas leases upon certain federal lands."34 Plaintiffs
claimed that they, as the "first qualified applicants," were entitled
to the leases under section 17 of the Mineral Leasing Act. 35 The
Secretary had denied their applications because the lands in question
had already been leased to prior applicants. He had rejected the
contention that, since the application for the earlier leases had been
made when, under the pertinent statutes and executive orders, the
lands were closed to leasing, those earlier leases were void. 36
One would surely have expected the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which had been invoked and explained in Malone, to be
applied with even greater vigor in Tallman. In Malone the plaintiff's grievance was, in essence, that the Government was holding land
which belonged to him; in Tallman the plaintiffs' claim was merely
that the Government wrongfully refused to sell them a lease. In
Malone, as far as the opinions indicate, the plaintiff had been accorded no official administrative hearings, much less any administrative appeals to a high level of executive authority; in Tallman,
on the other hand, the plaintiffs had already gone through a formalized system of administrative hearings and appeals, and their
assertions had been heard and rejected in written opinions by a
local land office, by the Director of the Bureau of Land Management,
and, finally, by the Secretary of the Interior.37 In Malone the suit
was merely to enforce a right to possession38 and technically sought
no action by the Government itself; in Tallman the petition demanded a transfer of legal interest which could be effected only by
the United States. Finally, in Malone the central legal issue in dis34. 380 U.S. at 3. The complaint also requested declaratory relief and "review [of]
the action of the defendant in accordance with the provisions of Section 10 of the
Administrative Procedure Act." Record at 9. Pursuant to its recent practice (see note
13 supra), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had been even less
precise in its description of the nature of the action, contenting itself with the state•
ment that it was "an action to review [the Secretary of the Interior's] decision rejecting
appellants' applications for oil and gas leases." Tallman v. Udall, 324 F.2d 411 (D.C.
Cir. 1963).
35. 30 U.S.C. § 226 (1958), as amended, (1964), which provided, in relevant part,
that "the person first making application for the lease who is qualified to hold a lease
•.• shall be entitled to a lease of such lands without competitive bidding."
36. That nullity would be the effect of premature application was not disputed. 324
F.2d at 416. The case therefore turned upon the question whether the lands were with•
drawn from leasing during the relevant period.
37. The plaintiffs' appeal to the Secretary had actually been disposed of by a
deputy solicitor. Plaintiffs objected to this delegation of ultimate authority, and filed
a subsequent petition for the exercise of supervisory authority by the Secretary; that
petition was itself ruled upon and denied by a deputy solicitor. See 'il,I 14-15 of the
complaint, Record at 7-8.
38. Bowdoin v. Malone, 284 F.2d 95, 98 (5th Cir. 1960).
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pute involved the chain of title to real estate, a matter supremely
appropriate for judicial determination; in Tallman the dispute
turned principally upon the interpretation and effect of an intricate
series of statutes, executive orders, and administrative regulationsall of which are the everyday business of the Department of the
Interior rather than the courts.
Nevertheless, as the reader has no doubt surmised by now, the
Supreme Court did not dismiss Tallman on the grounds of sovereign
immunity. On the contrary, it granted to the plaintiffs a thorough,
if not exhaustive, review of the administrative agency's denial of
their claims. To be sure, the administrative action was not overturned, and the plaintiffs were denied the requested relief; but that
action was taken only after a detailed, twenty-page examination of
the permissibility of the administrative action under the applicable
statutes, executive orders, and regulations. Even more surprising,
the bar of sovereign immunity was not mentioned in the Court's
opinion; nor had it been mentioned in the opinion of the court
of appeals, 39 in the judgment memorandum of the trial court, in the
pleadings of the parties, or in the parties' briefs at any level. The
narrow objective of this Article is to determine why.
The first explanation which comes to mind is that Tallman
simply fell within one of those exceptions to the bar of sovereign
immunity which both Larson and Malone had recognized-that is,
that the case involved action which either exceeded the officer's statutory authority or was unconstitutional. Some commentators have
indeed placed the case within the first of those exceptions:
At least on the surface, it would appear that the doctrine of sovereign immunity thus applied would bar a suit for judicial review of
the action of the Secretary of the Interior wherein it is alleged merely
that the Secretary while acting within his valid statutory authority
misconstrued a statute or made an erroneous determination of fact.
However, if the Secretary has in fact misconstrued a statute, his action
taken pursuant to his erroneous construction of the terms of the
authority granted him by the statute necessarily exceeds the terms of
his statutory authority, for if they [sic] did not, his construction of the
statute could not be erroneous. By the same token, if his decision
is based upon an erroneous determination of fact, or a determination
of fact which cannot be supported by substantial evidence, and the
existence of that fact is essential to his exercise of authority under
the statute, then he has either exceeded or failed to exercise the authority and duties conferred upon him by the statute.40
39. Tallman v. Udall, 324 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
40. Sperling &: Cooney, Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions Under the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, I LAND&: WATER L. REv. 428, 428 (1966).
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Such an interpretation of the phrase, "exceeding the terms of statutory authority," is surely a possible one; but just as surely it is not
the one intended by Larson and Malone.
It is argued that an officer given the power to make decisions is
only given the power to make correct decisions. If his decisions are
not correct, then his action based on those decisions is beyond his
authority and not the action of the sovereign. There is no warrant
for such a contention in cases in which the decision made by the
officer does not relate to the terms of his statutory authority. Certainly the jurisdiction of a court to decide a case does not disappear
i£ its decision on the merits is ·wrong. And we have heretofore rejected
the argument that official action is invalid if based on an incorrect
decision as to law or fact, i£ the officer making the decision was empowered to do so.... We therefore reject the contention here. ·we
hold that i£ the actions of an officer do not conflict with the terms
of his valid statutory authority, then they are the actions of the
sovereign, whether or not they are tortious under general law, if
they would be regarded as the actions of a private principal under
the normal rules of agency.41
If a forest ranger who is authorized to occupy Government land is
also "authorized" to occupy private land which he erroneously believes to belong to the Government, then similarly the Secretary of
the Interior is "authorized" to refuse issuance of a lease even for an
erroneous reason.
Likewise, the action in Tallman does not fall within the other
Larson-Malone exception, that of unconstitutionality. The mere
filing of an application for a lease, even ·when that filing renders
the applicant the "first qualified applicant" under the Mineral Leasing Act, does not appear sufficient to create a property right protected
by the fifth amendment.42 Even if it were, the Court of Claims remedy which prevented the officials' action in Larson and Malone from
being unconstitutional43 would apply in Tallman as well,44 and with
similar effect.
Moreover, even if the agent's action had exceeded the statutory
grant of authority, and even if it had been unconstitutional, the
relief sought in Tallman, unlike that in Malone, would have fallen
within the limitation which Larson placed upon the "ultra vires"
and "unconstitutional" exceptions to the bar of sovereign immunity.
Under that limitation, even a suit othenvise falling within one of
41. Larson v. Domestic 8: Foreign Commerce Corp., 33'7 U.S. 682, 695 (1949).
42. See Southwestern Petroleum Corp. v. Udall, 361 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1966);
Haley v. Seaton, 281 F.2d 620 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
43. See text accompanying notes 26, 32 supra.
44. Cf. Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 3'71 U.S. 334 (1963).
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the exceptions may fail "if the relief requested cannot be gTanted
by merely ordering the cessation of the conduct complained of but
will require affirmative action by the sovereign or the disposition of
unquestionably sovereign property."45
A more satisfactory method of reconciling Tallman with Malone
might be found in the argument that section 226-2 of the Mineral
Leasing Act, a section that was enacted in 1960, constituted a waiver
of sovereign immunity.46 But if statutory waiver is the explanation,
it seems strange, at best, that the Court made no mention of the
statute in the Tallman opinion. Moreover, if section 226-2 was really
intended to allow suit in situations in which none would otherwise
lie, Congress certainly chose an excessively subtle means to make that
simple purpose manifest. On its face, the section supplies merely a
statute of limitations for actions that are already permissible, and on
a fair reading is no more a grant of consent for new actions against
the Secretary than the general statute of limitations applicable to
actions against the United States47 is a complete waiver of the Government's sovereign immunity. In addition, as will be seen below, Tallman is representative of a long line of cases reaching a similar result
as to sovereign immunity, some of which did not involve the Mineral
Leasing Act, and some of which, while involving the Act, concerned
transactions to which the 1960 amendment did not apply.48
It might next be suggested that the surprise expressed above at
the fact that it was not only the Court which failed to mention
sovereign immunity in Tallman but the Solicitor General as well, is
akin to a child's astonishment at watching a tight-rope walker for
the first time-how marvelous that he should not only walk along
45. 337 U.S. at 691 n.11. But see note 32 supra.
46. 30 U .S.C. § 226-2 (1964) provides:
No action contesting a decision of the Secretary involving any oil and gas lease
shall be maintained unless such action is commenced or taken within ninety days
after the final decision of the Secretary relating to such matter. No such action
contesting such a decision of the Secretary rendered prior to September 2, 1960
shall be maintained unless the same be commenced or taken within ninety days
after such [sic] enactment.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (1964), providing in part that "every civil action commenced
against the United States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years
after the right of action first accrues."
48. See, e.g., Boescl1e v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472 (1963), which was decided before Malone
but after Larson, and in which the Court made a detailed review of the legitimacy of a
lease cancellation by the Secretary, even though the suit was filed before enactment of
§ 226-2. It is conceivable, although barely, that the statute not only is a source of jurisdiction, but also applies to suits brought before its enactment. The Court, however, did
not go into this fine question. On the contrary, its only reference to § 226-2 was not by
way of setting forth the sovereign consent under which suit was permitted, but rather
in support of the statement that "final action by the Secretary ••• has always been
subject to judicial review." 373 U.S. at 486.
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such a narrow ·wire, but carry and balance a long stick at the same
time! That is, it might be urged that the failure of the Government
to assert sovereign immunity is not a puzzlement added to that of the
Court's silence on the point, but is rather the reason for the Court's
silence. This explanation would nicely reconcile Tallman and Malone; and though it would still leave unillumined the reason for the
Government's failure to raise the defense, that problem might be
dismissed as more appropriate for political scientists, management
consultants, or even psychiatrists, than for la'wyers. Unfortunately,
however, this analysis is vitiated by two well-established propositions
concerning sovereign immunity. First, the defense of sovereign immunity can be waived only by express authority of Congress and not
by the action or inaction of any federal officer.40 Second, this defense
goes to the jurisdiction of the court,50 so that an appellate court will
not only refuse to find a "waiver" in the failure to raise the defense
below,51 but will remedy, sua sponte, the failure to raise it upon
appeal, 52 and will dismiss the case, if necessary, over the objections
of both parties.53
The above are some of the more obvious or apparently cogent
explanations of Tallman. There are others as well, the most noteworthy of which is the proposition that section lO(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act54 is a waiver of sovereign immunity-a position
which will be considered below in a somewhat different context.tiG
Suffice it to say that all of these explanations either do not support
Tallman's disregard of sovereign immunity or, in supporting it,
contradict Malone.
We have thus far been considering Tallman as a "sovereign immunity case." The only other cases falling within this category which
we have described are Lee, Larson, and Malone. But in its totality,
the category is enormous, covering the entire field of public law. To
be impressed with this fact, the reader need only scan Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Larson, 56 in which even that master of the com49. Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 389 (1939); Stanley v. Schwalby, 162
U.S. 255, 269-70 (1896).
50. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941); Nassau Smelting &: Ref. Works,
Ltd. v. United States, 266 U.S. 101 (1924).
51. E.g., United States v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 226, 229, 238-39 (1938).
52. Mellos v. Brownell, 250 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1957). See Stratton v. St. Louis S.'W.
Ry., 282 U.S. 10 (1930).
53. E.g., Armstrong v. United States, 283 F.2d 122 (3d Cir. 1960).
54. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
55. See notes 226-29 infra and accompanying text and the Appendix following this
Article.
56. 337 U.S. at 705-32.
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pendious opinion succeeds in collecting only some of the Supreme
Court opinions on the subject and fares even more poorly in his
attempt to divide them into some logical subcategories.57 The multitudinous areas of human activity and of legal ordering which the
"sovereign immunity cases" cover are exemplified by the following
Supreme Court cases: a suit to recover from the Maritime Commission common stock which the plaintiffs asserted had been pledged
as collateral for a debt subsequently paid, but which the Commission
claimed had been transferred outright; 58 a suit to enjoin a postmaster
from infringing the plaintiff's patent on a stamp-cancelling and postmarking machine; 59 a suit to compel the Secretary of the Navy to
deliver to the plaintiff a cruiser which the Secretary had advertised
for sale and for which the plaintiff had submitted the highest bid; 60
a suit for injunction against a refusal of the Post Office Department
to carry certain mail; 61 a suit to restrain the Secretary of War from
instituting criminal prosecution of the plaintiff for the construction
of a wharf which would cross harbor lines established by the Secretary;62 a suit to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior from increasing
the rentals for, and decreasing the deliveries of, water from a federally operated irrigation system; 63 a suit for declaratory judgment
and injunction to prevent the Under Secretary of the Navy from
taking action under the Renegotiation Act to stop payments due to
the plaintiff under certain contracts; 64 and a suit against a Collector
of Internal Revenue for refund of taxes erroneously collected. 65 To
this list there may be added, of course, the cases previously discussed
-namely, actions of ejectment against federal officers (Lee and
Malone), an action against the War Assets Administrator for, essentially, specific performance at law of a contract to purchase coal
(Larson), and an action to compel the Secretary of the Interior to
issue oil and gas leases (Tallman).
In other words, the category of "sovereign immunity cases" (within which, on any proper view of the matter, Tallman must be included) represents more of an analytical and theoretical unit than
what might be termed an existential one. The only significant factual
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISI'RATIVE LAW TREATISE§ 27.05, at 571-76 (1958).

Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947).
International Postal Supply Co. v. Bruce, 194 U.S. 601 (1904).
Goldberg v. Daniels, 231 U.S. 218 (1913).
Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605 (1912).
Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82 (1937).
Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U.S. 371 (1945).
See Sage v. United States, 250 U.S. 33 (1919).
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similarity which the cases share is the extremely broad one that they
all seek some relief against a federal officer or agency. In casual conversation with a colleague, a lawyer would hardly describe the case he
was currently working on as a "sovereign immunity case"; that would
identify nothing, except one legal issue common to a vast number
of cases having highly diverse factual contents, involving claims for
very dissimilar relief, and raising a great variety of legal questions
in addition to that of the Government's liability to suit. A la·wyer
might speak of a products liability case, an automobile accident case,
or an eviction case; only a scholar is likely to talk of a "sovereign
immunity case."
But though most of the "sovereign immunity cases," Larson
among them, involve unique or rarely recurring fact situations, some
fall into well-defined and fully developed "existential" categories of
legal activity. There are, for example, the public-lands cases, which
constitute what is probably the oldest continuous body of federal caselaw relating to the validity and effect of a particular type of administrative activity. It is through an examination of this category,
rather than of the "sovereign immunity cases," that an explanation
of Tallman is to be found.
II. PUBLIC-LANDS LAw

In the present age, it is difficult to apprehend the former magnitude and importance of public-lands law. Our present society contains no institution, with the possible exception of the federal income
tax, whose importance to the federal government and whose effect
upon the course of national development remotely approximates the
dominating influence of the public lands during the nineteenth century. The federal government at one time or another owned approximately three-fourths of all land in the contiguous United States.
The purposes for which this national patrimony was expended have
been many: to pay the national debt; 66 to induce and reward military
66. Prior to 1789 there was indeed no other resource with which the national debt
could be paid. The Confederation had no taxing power, but had received cessions of
the western claims of five of the original thirteen states. The Land Ordinance of 1785,
providing for the sale of these western lands, was born of sheer economic necessity.
See B. HIBBARD, A HISTORY OF THE PuBLIC LAND POLICIES 32 (1939) [hereinafter HIBBARD]; P. GATES, HrsroRY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENl' 51-55, 61-63 (1968) [hereinafter GATES]. That the production of revenue was also a prominent purpose, if not
the foremost goal, of early federal land-grant legislation is evident from the high
minimum sales price ($2.00 per acre) set by the first federal statute, the Act of May 18,
1796, I Stat. 494, and retained until 1820. See HIBBARD 76-'17. It appears perhaps even
more clearly from the fact that the same statute placed responsibility for the sales
of public lands on the Secretary of the Treasury, in whom ultimate authority remained until creation of the Interior Department in 1849. See GATES 126-28. As late
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service; 67 to encourage western migration; 68 to subsidize the construction, by private enterprise, of wagon roads, railroads, and
canals; 69 to produce revenue for the individual states; 70 to foster
education; 71 to encourage the forestation of the prairies72 and the
reclamation of arid lands; 78 and to spur the exploration for, and
as the 1840's, the public lands were still put up for sale primarily for the purpose
of raising revenue. GATES 177-78.
67. A number of the states, most notably Virginia and Connecticut, promised
military bounties during the Revolution, as did the Continental Congress, before it
even had the lands with which to make its promise good. The United States granted
land bounties to soldiers of all wars through the Civil War. See HmBARD ch. VII;
GATES ch. XI. In all, about 61,000,000 acres, or an area equivalent to the land contained within the State of Oregon, was disposed of in this manner. See U.S. DEPT. OF
THE INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 1968, tables 1 8: 3 [hereinafter PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS].
68. This purpose, most prominently espoused by Horace Greeley, was behind the
Homestead Act, Act of May 20, 1862, 12 Stat. 392. See HIBBARD ch. XVII; GATES ch.
XV. A total of approximately 287,500,000 acres, or land area equal to that in the
states of Texas, Colorado, and Utah was granted or sold to homesteaders. PUBLIC LAND
STATISTICS tables 1 8: 3.
69. Pre•eminent among these cessions both in importance and abuse were the Railroad Land Grants, whereby vast areas were conveyed to private companies or to states
(which in tum conveyed them to private companies) in exchange for the construction of
railroads. See HIBBARD ch. XIII; GATES ch. XIV. A total of 131,400,000 acres, an area
slightly in excess of all land within the states of New York and California combined,
was disposed of for this purpose alone. PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS tables 1 8: 3.
70. The Act of Sept. 4, 1841, 5 Stat. 453, granting 500,000 acres to each of the
public-land states and to each state admitted to the Union thereafter, and the general Swamp Lands Act of 1850, 9 Stat. 519, exemplified this purpose in practice, if
not in theory. See HIBBARD 228-33, ch. XIV; GATES ch. XIII.
71. The Land Ordinance of 1785 adopted by the Confederation had provided that
section 16 of every township in the new territory would be reserved "for the maintenance of public schools within the said township." This scheme became a regular
feature of the land-grant system, so that each new state, upon its admission to the
Union, if not while it still occupied territorial status, was granted section 16 of each
township (or when section 16 was unavailable, suitable "indemnity lands'') for school
purposes. After 1848, the practice was expanded to include section 36 as well as section
16 of each township. See HIBBARD ch. XVI; GATES 65, ch. XII. A total of 77,600,000
acres, or an area roughly equivalent to land within the states of Oklahoma and Arkansas, has been granted to the states for support of common schools. PUBLIC LAND
STATISTICS tables 1 8: 3.
72. The Timber Culture Act of 1873, 17 Stat. 605, enabled a settler to acquire
title to an entire quarter-section by planting and growing timber on forty acres of
that quarter-section. The acreage requirement was reduced to ten in 1878, 20 Stat.
113. See HIBBARD ch. XIX; GATES 399-401. The total amount of land disposed of under
this Act alone is relatively insignificant-a mere 10,900,000 acres, an area only slightly
larger than the land contained within the District of Columbia and the states of
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, and Rhode Island. PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS tables
1 &: 3.
73. The Desert Land Act of 1877, 19 Stat. 377, gave the settler who would irrigate
the land and make improvement upon it the right to purchase 640 acres for the low
price of $1.25 per acre. See HIBBARD ch. XX; GATES 401, 635-43. The acreage disposed
of under this Act has been 10,600,000 acres, an area roughly equivalent to the land
in New Jersey and New Hampshire. PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS tables 1 &: 3.
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exploitation of, mineral resources. 74 For these purposes and others,
the federal government has disposed of approximately 1.2 billion
acres of land, 75 more than one-half of the land area of the contiguous
United States. Moreover, even that figure does not take account of
dispositions of less than the fee interest, which have constituted the
vast majority of all dispositions sin~e 1920.76 All of this activity has
not occurred without giving rise, from the very beginning, to a
constant stream of litigation. In the seventh volume of Wheaton's
Reports, 77 for example, eleven of the thirty-one cases reported, and
almost one-third of the pages, are devoted to state or federal landgrant matters. In the early part of the nineteenth century, cases involving land-grants from the states or the colonies naturally tended
to predominate over those involving grants from the federal government;78 but the latter began to appear at an early date, 70 and by
the end of the century attained what might today be termed habeas
corpus proportions.so
A. The Early Public-Lands Cases

One might expect that the older a particular area of administrative law is, the more likely it is to have been permeated by the
74. The Mining Law of 1872, 17 Stat. 91 (now codified in scattered sections of 30
U.S.C.), provided for the survey and sale of lode claims at $5 per acre and placer
claims at $2.50 per acre. Mineral lands had generally been excluded from the earlier
federal grants. In 1920, perhaps reflecting a basic change in attitude as to whether
it is desirable for the federal government to transfer its valuable lands to private
ownership, Congress passed the Mineral Leasing Act, 41 Stat. 437, now codified in 30
U.S.C. § 181 (1964). This and subsequent statutes provide for the grant of only
leasehold interests in what are clearly, during the present century, the most valuable
of the federal mineral lands, namely, oil and gas lands. Thus, in 1968 only 39 mineral
patents were issued covering only 3,338 acres of land, whereas during the same period
15,445 mineral leases were issued, covering approximately 14,967,000 acres of land, of
which all except 191 leases, covering approximately 387,000 acres, were for oil and gas.
PUBUC LAND STATISTICS tables 46, 55, 56. See HIBBARD ch. XXV; GATES ch. XXIII. It
was the Mineral Leasing Act which was involved in Tallman.
75. GATES ii; PUBUC LAND STATISTICS table 3.
76. See note 74 supra.
77. 20 U.S., Feb. Term, 1822.
78. E.g., Wilson v. Mason, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 44 (1801) (a suit to prevent the
register of the Kentucky land office from issuing a patent to one who claimed to have
made a valid entry under a 1779 Virginia statute); Huidekoper's Lessee v. Douglass,
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) I (1805) (an ejectment action to test whether the Holland Company
had effectively acquired title under a 1792 Pennsylvania statute to lands in what is
now Ohio).
79. See, e.g., Matthews v. Zane, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 382 (1808) and Matthews v. Zane's
Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 92 (1809), an ejectment action in which both parties claimed
title from the United States by virtue of certificates received under the Act of May IO,
1800, 5 Stat. 174. The Secretary of the Treasury had declared the first certificate void,
and the Court's decision supported that determination.
80. The three Swamp Lands Acts of 1849, 1850 and 1860, for example, had alone
given rise to almost 200 Supreme Court cases by 1888. GATES 324.
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"antiquated" doctrine of sovereign immunity. It is the fact, however,
that during the nineteenth century, despite the considerable volume
of public-lands litigation, no public-lands case against a federal officer-for mandamus, injunction, or ejectment-was dismissed by the
Supreme Court on the ground of sovereign immunity. Nor, so far
as this ·writer is aware, do any of the summaries of the arguments of
counsel printed in the official reports for this period indicate that
dismissal on the basis of sovereign immunity was ever seriously urged
upon the Court in a public-lands case.81 That significant absence can
certainly not be attributed to a lack of appealing cases in which to
raise the point. At least four cases during the nineteenth century
involved actions of ejectment against federal army officers occupying
military installations-surely a use that is supremely evocative of sovereign connotations. In the first of these, Chief Justice Marshall
permitted the plaintiff to eject federal officers from a garrison which
had been fortified in 1815 at an expense of thirty thousand dollars.82
In the others, 83 the rights of the federal officers were upheld, but
only after detailed factual and legal analysis which simple applica•
tion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity would have rendered
unnecessary. 84
The explanation of this phenomenon is that even though the
nineteenth century held the principle of sovereign immunity in more
veneration than does the twentieth, it also had greater reverence for
81. In Meigs v. M'Clung's Lessee, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 11 (1815), the point was
evidently made and rejected in the lower court [see the discussion of the lower court
proceedings in United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 210-11 (1882)]; but it apparently was
not referred to by counsel in argument before the Supreme Court, nor was it con·
sidered in the Court's opinion. In Grisar v. McDowell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 363 (1867),
and Brown v. Huger, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 305 (1858), the defendants referred to the fact
that tl1ey occupied the properties in question as agents of the United States; but no
argument on the ground of sovereign immunity was apparently made to the Court,
nor was sovereign immunity referred to in the Court's opinions.
82. Meigs v. M'Clung's Lessee, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 11 (1815).
83. Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498 (1839) (defendant was the commanding
officer of Fort Dearborn, Chicago); Brown v. Huger, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 305 (1858) (defendant was an Ordnance officer in command of the United States Armory at Harper's
Ferry-the plaintiff no relation to the Brown who took the property in question by
more direct means a year later); Grisar v. McDowell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 363 (1867) (defendant was the United States general in command of the military department of
California, including the military reserve in San Francisco Bay which was the subject
of suit.)
84. Moreover, in Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498 (1839), the clarity of the
Court's assumption that the doctrine of sovereign immunity has no application is
emphasized by tlie fact tliat tlie opinion explicitly acknowledged that the suit was
"in effect against tlie United States.'' The Court concluded from tliis, however, not
tliat sovereign immunity barred tlie action, but that tlie defendant must prevail since,
no patent having issued, legal title remained in the United States, and since, whatever
equities tlie plaintiff might have possessed, tlie legal title had to control in an action
at law. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 516.
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the integrity of the pleadings. If the sovereign was not named, the
sovereign was not sued. That issue had been fought sharply during
the early years of the century in several cases involving the eleventh
amendment, and the outcome had been unequivocal: "In deciding
who are parties to the suit, the court will not look beyond the
record." 86
B. Appearance of the Immunity Obstacle

This admirable freedom from the complications of sovereign
immunity, which nonstatutory review of public-lands determinations
had originally enjoyed, was seemingly eliminated in the early years
of the present century. That development was largely the result of
two unfortunate historical accidents.

I. The Eleventh-Amendment Cases
The first was the regrettable equation which had been made during the nineteenth century between what might be called "domestic"
and "foreign" sovereign immunity-that is, between the principles
governing the amenability of a state to suit before its own courts and
those governing its amenability to suit before the courts of another
sovereign. The two areas are, of course, not at all the same, as the
Supreme Court has explicitly acknowledged in another context.86
"Foreign" immunity-exemption from the compulsory process of
another sovereign-might well be deemed essential to the security
and dignity of a state, and it is certainly much more deserving of
protection against formalistic evasion than is the exemption of the
state's executive or legislative branches from the compulsory process
of its own judiciary. The eleventh amendment to the Constitution
embodies only that "foreign" immunity, protecting the states from
being sued before federal tribunals by citizens of other states or
nations. During the nineteenth century, however, the Supreme Court
treated cases arising under the eleventh amendment as involving essentially the same issue as those cases which dealt with the "domestic"
immunity of the United States itself. Decisions concerning one area
were consistently cited as pertinent authority in opinions dealing
with the other. 87
85. Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203, 220 (1872). See also United States v.
Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531 (1875).
86. National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 358-59 (1955).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882) [a federal sovereign immunity
case which cited many ele\'enth-amendment cases, including Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S.
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It eventually and inevitably became clear that the "party of record" test described above 88 could not continue to be applied to
the eleventh-amendment cases without flouting the clear intent of
the Constitution. One has complete control over a state if he has
complete control over the agents through whom alone the state can
act. Thus, the latter part of the nineteenth century witnessed an
effort on the part of the Court to retreat from the "party of record"
test in state immunity cases. In a famous series of decisions, the Court
held that in certain circumstances--which, it must be acknowledged,
the Court was unable to delineate with much precision or consistency
-a suit against a state officer would constitute a suit against the
sovereign and thus be barred from the federal courts by the eleventh
amendment.80 Those decisions were accompanied by vigorous dissents, but by 1887, in In re Aye1-s, 90 the majority of the Court felt
able to say the following:
It must be regarded as a settled doctrine of this court, established by
its recent decisions, "that the question whether a suit is within the
prohibition of the 11th Amendment is not always determined by
reference to t11e nominal parties on the record.'' 91 This, it is true is
not in harmony with what was said by Chief Justice Marshall in
Osborn v. Bank of the United States [citation omitted]. 92
As noted above, there was nothing in logic or in policy which required that this new proscription of the technical evasion of "foreign"
sovereign immunity-or, more precisely, of that aspect of "foreign"
sovereign immunity which was guaranteed to the states by the Con(16 Wall.) 203 (1872), and Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
7!18 (1824)]: and In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887) [an eleventh-amendment case which
cited many federal sovereign immunity cases, including United States v. Lee, supra,
Meigs v. l\I'Clung's Lessee, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 11 (1815), Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S.
(13 Pet.) 498 (1839), Brown v. Huger, 62 U.S. 305 (1858), and Grisar v. McDowell, 73
U.S. 36!1 (1867)].
88. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
89. Sec Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1882); Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U.S.
769 (1882): Cunningham v. Macon &: B. R.R., 109 U.S. 446 (1883); Poindexter v.
Grecnhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1884); Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52 (1886); In re Ayers,
123 U.S. 443 (1887). Some of these cases mingled the notion that the state is
the real defendant and that therefore the eleventh amendment bars the suit, with
the concept that the state ought to be a defendant, since it is an indispensable party,
and that therefore the suit must be dismissed. The fusion, or confusion, of these
two grounds is very common. See text accompanying notes 136-39 infra.
90. 123 U .s. 443 (1887).
91. Citing Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1884).
92. 123 U.S. at 487. Later cases before the turn of the century appeared to retreat
from this position and even to attempt a reinstatement of the "party of record" test
of Osborn and Davis. See Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1 (1891); In re Tyler,
149 U.S. 164 (1893); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan &: Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894). But
the damage had been done, and the reinstatement was not successful.
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stitution-be applied to the "domestic" doctrine as well, thereby
destroying or impairing a tradition of nonstatutory review of administrative action as venerable as Marbury v.1"\1adison. 93 That tradition,
far from considering suits in a state's own courts against its own officers to be suits against the sovereign without its consent, had considered many such suits-namely, all mandamus actions-to be, in
principle, actions by the sovereign, on the relation of a private individual, to compel the sovereign's agent to perform his assigned function. 94 But logic, policy, and history were all beclouded by the ingrained habit of treating the eleventh-amendment cases and the
"domestic" sovereign immunity cases alike. Consequently, a change
made to protect the states from the federal courts, as the Constitution
required, had the very different effect of insulating the federal government from the federal courts, thereby casting a shadow upon the
entire field of nonstatutory review.

2. Minnesota v. Hitchcock-Its Birth and Deformation
Nevertheless, the review of public-lands determinations, because
of its importance and its long history, might still have continued
unimpaired were it not for another coincidence, or series of coincidences, at the beginning of the present century. In 1899 there was
filed in the United States Supreme Court the case of Minnesota v.
Hitchcock, 95 an original action against the Secretary of the Interior
and the Commissioner of the General Land Office, asserting the
state's ownership, under an 1857 school-land grant, of certain lands
which, according to the defendants, the United States held in trust
for the Chippewa Indians. At issue were some 190,000 acres, and
the state was apparently in immediate need of the revenues which
could be derived from that land. The defendants' answer to the
bill maintained that the Chippewas were indispensable parties,
93. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
94. The practice in the federal courts has not been consistent as to the naming
of the United States as the formal party plaintiff in mandamus actions. Compare the
captions of the following Supreme Court cases, all of which were mandamus actions
brought by private individuals: Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)
(original action); M'Intire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504 (1813); Kendall v. United
States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838); United States v. Commissioner, 72
U.S. (5 Wall.) 563 (1866); Secretary v. McGarrahan, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 298 (1869); United
States v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378 (1880); In re Emblen, 161 U.S. 52 (1896) (original action);
Ballinger v. United States ex rel. Frost, 216 U.S. 240 (1910). It appears that the days
in which the sovereign must be named as the formal party are long past and that in
most jurisdictions it may be improper to bring the suit in the name of anyone except
the real party in interest. See Annot., 105 Am. St. R. 122 (1905); Annot., 64 A.L.R.
622 (1913); 35 AM. JUR. Mandamus §§ 318-26, at 71-79 (1941).
95. 185 U.S. 373 (1902).
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without whom the Court could not proceed, and that the suit was
not within the original jurisdiction of the Court, since the dispute
was between the state and the Chippewas, many of whom were
citizens of Minnesota. In order to eliminate these objections, political influence was evidently brought to bear, and a bill was drafted
which would "dispose of the technical difficulty set forth in the
answer." 00 That bill was introduced in the Senate97 by Minnesota
Senator Nelson, and in the House of Representatives 98 by Minnesota
Congressman Eddy; it received such speedy attention that it was
passed by both houses within two weeks, 99 and signed by the Preside°ut
within three. 100 In its final form, this Act of March 2, 1901 read:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That in any suit
heretofore or hereafter instituted in the Supreme Court of the United
States to determine the right of a State to what are commonly known:
as school lands within any Indian reservation of any Indian cession
where an Indian tribe claims any right to or interest in the lands in
controversy, or in the disposition thereof by the United States, the
right of such State may be fully tested and determined without making the Indian tribe, or any portion thereof a party to the suit, if
the Secretary of the Interior is made a party thereto; and the duty
of representing and defending the right or interest of the Indian
tribe, or any portion thereof, in the matter shall devolve upon the
Attorney General upon the request of such Secretary.101

The law suit then proceeded. It was argued the following November
and decided the next May. Because of its unapparent subtlety and
the resultant distorting effect upon the development of nonstatutory
review in the public-lands field, the case requires close attention.
What the state sought in Minnesota v. Hitchcock was an injunction restraining the Secretary and the Commissioner from selling any of the contested lands. In oral argument, the defendants
no longer contested the issue of jurisdiction.102 The Court, however,
was not quite so easily satisfied. Its opinion began as follows:
96. H.R. REP. No. 2948, 56th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1901).
97, S. 5978, 56th Cong., 2d Sess. (1901).
98. H.R. 14,191, 56th Cong., 2d Sess. (1901).
99. 34 CoNG, R.Ec. 2804 (Senate Passage-Feb. 22, 1901), 3071 (House passageFcb. 26, 1901).
100. 34 CONG. REc. 3523 (March 2, 1901).
101. 31 Stat. 950 (1901).
102. It would certainly have been most unseemly for them to do so since, according
to H.R. REP. No. 2948, 56th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1901), the bill specifically designed to
eliminate that issue had been "drafted by the attorneys representing the various
parties," and according to the statements of Senator Nelson during the brief debate
upon the bill in the Senate, it had been "prepared by the Interior Department." 34
CONG. REc. 2804 (1901).
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A preliminary question is one of jurisdiction. It is true counsel
for defendants did not raise the question, and evidently both parties
desire that the court should ignore it and dispose of the case on the
merits. But the silence of counsel does not waive the question, nor
would the express consent of the parties give to this court a jurisdiction which was not warranted by the Constitution and laws.103
By the time of Minnesota v. Hitchcock there had been hundreds of
cases in the federal courts seeking mandamus or injunction against
land-office officials; federal jurisdiction had been easily provided
in most such cases arising after 1875 by the existence of a federal
question. 104 But although a federal question was clearly involved
in the instant case, the Supreme Court was reluctant to rely upon
that basis with respect to a suit asserted to be within its original
jurisdiction. It feared that if the constitutional provision making
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction original in "those [cases] in which
a State shall be a Party" 105 should be interpreted to apply to all
state-party cases which come within federal cognizance for any reason whatever, including mere federal-question jurisdiction, then
"many cases, both of a legal and an equitable nature in respect to
which Congress has provided no suitable procedure, would be
brought within [the Supreme Court's] cognizance."106 Similarly, the
Court was not eager to predicate federal jurisdiction upon the fact
that the suit was bet:1veen a state and citizens of another state.107 It
observed that the Secretary and the Commissioner, "merely as citizens, have no interest in the controversy for or against the plaintiff;
[and] in case either of the defendants should die or resign and a
citizen of Minnesota be appointed in his place, the jurisdiction of
the court would cease, and this although the real parties in interest
remain the same."108 While not necessarily accepting the validity of
either of these objections, and indeed framing possible replies to
each, the Court nonetheless decided to rest its jurisdiction upon
what it considered safer ground:
We omit, as unnecessary to the disposition of this case, any consideration of the applicability of [the two above-discussed bases of
103. 185 U.S. at 382.
104. The Constitution's grant of general federal-question jurisdiction, U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2, was first implemented by the 1875 Judiciary Act, Act of March !l, 1875, § 1,
18 Stat. 470. See H.M. HART &: H. VlECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 727-30 (1953).
105. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2.
106. 185 U.S. at 384.
107. U.S. CoNST. art. III,§ 2 provides in part: "The judicial power shall extend •••
to Controversies ••• between a State and Citizens of another State .••."
108. 185 U.S. at 383-84.
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jurisdiction] because we think the case comes within the scope of
the third ... , and we need not now go further. This is a controversy
to which the United States may be regarded as a party.1 0 9
The Court then proceeded (and the progression of the argument
here is critically important) to meet the objection that the clause
of the Constitution conferring federal jurisdiction in situations in
which the United States is a party110 means to refer only to cases
in which the United States is the party plaintiff. For that purpose,
the Court quoted and discussed as being "in point, and . . . very
suggestive," 111 its opinion in United States v. Texas,11 2 in which
it had rejected the contention by the State of Texas that the grant
to the Supreme Court of original jurisdiction in "those [cases] in
which a State shall be a Party" 113 did not apply to those cases in which
the opposite party was the United States. That earlier opinion had
reasoned that such construction of the phrase was untenable "unless
a State is exempt altogether from suit by the United States"; 114 and
that the latter proposition clearly could not have been the intent
of the framers because it must have been obvious to them that
controversies would arise between the federal government and the
states, and that the most appropriate forum to resolve those controversies would be the federal courts-more specifically, the Supreme
Court. Having concluded its quotation from United States v. Texas
·with these comments of the earlier opinion, the Court in Minnesota
v. Hitchcock completed its own discussion of the point as follows:
While the United States as a government may not be sued without
its consent, yet with its consent it may be sued, and the judicial
power of the United States extends to such a controversy. Indeed,
the whole jurisdiction of the Court of Claims rests upon this proposition.115
It is important to realize that this paragraph was not written with
an eye to the objection that sovereign immunity barred the suit
presently before the Court. That objection had not even been
raised in the opinion; and, if it had been, its rebuttal would surely
have called for citation of more concrete authority. Rather, the
109. 185 U.S. at 384.
llO. U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2 provides in part: "The judicial power shall extend
••• to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party . . • ."
Ill. 185 U.S. at 384.
112. 143 U.S. 621 (1892).
113. U.S. CONsr, art. III, § 2,
114. United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 644 (1892), quoted in Minnesota v. Hitch•
cock, 185 U.S. 373, 385 (1902).
115, 185 U.S. at 386.
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paragraph was meant only to demonstrate the obviousness of the
possibility that, in a suit involving a state, the United States might
be a defendant as well as a plaintiff-and hence the certainty that
the Court in United States v. Texas, in which the United States
was the plaintiff, also had the inverse situation in mind when it
spoke of the appropriateness of the Supreme Court in particular,
and of the federal courts in general, as a forum for federal-state
disputes. Considering itself thus enabled to rely upon the reasoning
in United States v. Texas, the Court in Minnesota v. Hitchcock decided that the constitutional grant of federal jurisdiction for cases
in which the United States is a party was meant to apply not only
to situations in which the United States is a plaintiff, but also to
those in which it is a defendant, at least with respect to state-party
original-jurisdiction cases.
Having reached that conclusion, the Court then proceeded to
raise another possible objection to this ground of jurisdiction: that
because the United States had not been named in the case at hand,
it was therefore not a party. Predictably, the Court applied to this
totally different problem the reasoning of the eleventh-amendment
cases, pronouncing once again that the "party-of-record" test was
dead, and quoting Ayers116 to the effect that the eleventh amendment
applies "when 'the State, though not named, is the real party against
which the relief is asked, and the judgment will operate.' " 117 The
Court took pains to point out, however, that the Ayers doctrine was
adopted only for the purpose of determining federal jurisdictionthe general question which both the eleventh-amendment cases
and the instant case had in common-and not for the purpose of
rendering sovereign immunity applicable to the ordinary mandamus
and injunction cases:
Of course, this statement [that the United States is the real party in
interest] has no reference to and does not include those cases in which
officers of the United States are sued, in appropriate form, to compel
them to perform some ministerial duty imposed upon them by law,
and which they wrongfully neglect or refuse to perform. Such suits
would not be deemed suits against the United States within the rule
that the Government cannot be sued except by its consent, nor within
the rule established in the Ayers case.118

Finally, the Court raised and refuted one last objection to its
116. 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
117. 185 U.S. at 386. This reliance on Ayers ignores, of course, the intervening
cases referred to in note 92 supra, which seemed to withdraw from the clarity of that
dictum.
118. 185 U.S. at 386 (emphasis added).
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basing jurisdiction upon the fact that the United States was a
party to the case-namely, the assertion that because the Government held the lands in trust for the Chippewa Indians and not on
its own account, the Chippewas and not the United States were the
real parties in interest. It was in reply to this assertion-and with
reference to this alone-that the Court referred to the Act of
March 2, 1901, discussed above. 119 That Act, it said, amounted to a
prescription by Congress that the United States be deemed the real
party in interest, and this prescription must be given effect.120 It
must be emphasized that the Act was referred to only in order to
overcome the objection that the United States was not the real
party in interest, and not with reference to the question of sovereign
immunity. Sovereign immunity was not even mentioned in the
opinion, except in the paragraph last quoted. 121 The Court's use
of the Act, then, was precisely in accord with the Act's purpose,
which, as shown by the legislative history, was not to overcome any
objection of sovereign immunity, but rather to satisfy the objection
originally raised by the defendants' answer to the bill-that the
United States was not a party.122
The next important case was almost predictable. At least some
state attorneys did not miss the opening apparently left by the
rationale of Minnesota v. Hitchcock. That decision had found the
Act of March 2, 1901 essential to the maintenance of the suit only
because it eliminated what might othenvise have been the purely
119. See text accompanying notes 96-101 supra.
120. The Court was not unaware of the limitation upon this power of Congress to
affect the application of article III, section 2 of the Constitution. See note 121 infra.
121, There is one portion of the Court's opinion dealing with the Act of March 2,
1901 which might be interpreted to apply to sovereign immunity, but only if read
in isolation and without an understanding of the progression of the argument. The
Court stated that Congress
has by this legislation in effect declared that the Indians, although the real parties
in interest, need not be made parties to the suit; that the United States will, for
the purposes of the litigation, stand as the real party in interest, and so far as
it could within constitutional limits has expressed the consent of the Government
to the maintenance of this suit in this court.
185 U.S. at 388 (emphasis added). The "consent" referred to in the italicized portion
evokes notions of waiver of sovereign immunity. From both the context of the passage
and its content, however, these notions can be seen to be erroneous. The context was
discussion concerning whether the United States was a real party in interest before
the Court, not whether it could be. The content included the clause "so far as it
could within constitutional limits," which makes no sense as applied to waiver of
sovereign immunity, but considerable sense as applied to the congressional power of
enabling a suit to be brought in the federal courts simply by decreeing that the
United States is to be deemed the party in interest. In other words, the Court was
referring to subject matter jurisdiction, rather than jurisdiction over the person. See
the Appendix following this Article.
122. See text accompan}ing note 96 supra.
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fiduciary character of the United States' interest. So long as the
interest of the United States in the matter involved was proprietary
and not fiduciary, presumably any state suit against federal officers
could be brought as an original action in the Supreme Court-a
state of affairs which would vastly increase the burden of the
Supreme Court's work, but which seemed clearly indicated by
Minnesota v. Hitchcock. Oregon v. Hitchcock 123 involved an original
bill for an injunction against the same Secretary of the Interior and
Commissioner of the General Land Office who had been defendants
in the 111innesota case; and like that earlier case, it involved a state
claim to lands which the Secretary was about to dispose of for the
benefit of certain Indians. Two crucial factors, however, were
different: (1) the state claim was based not upon a school-lands grant,
but upon a swamp-lands grant, so that the Act of March 2, 1901,
which by its terms ,vas limited to school lands, was not applicable;
and (2) the lands in question were asserted to be held by the
United States not in trust for the Indians, but rather in its own
right, and consequently, at least according to the reasoning in
111innesota v. Hitchcock, the Act of March 2, 1901 was unnecessary
to sustain the original bill. As the State of Minnesota had done,
Oregon sought to rest federal jurisdiction primarily upon the
ground that a suit against governmental officers with respect to
property which they hold in their official capacity is, for jurisdictional purposes, a suit against the Government. 124 At the same time,
however, in order to meet the argument of the defendants (who in
this case, unlike the Minnesota case, were inclined to challenge jurisdiction), Oregon was obliged to maintain the seemingly inconsistent
position that, for purposes of sovereign immunity, the suit was not
one against the Government. In support of that latter position, the
state could have cited many lands cases, and indeed it did cite five. 120
The Government, on the other hand, could cite no lands case to
support its claim that sovereign immunity barred the suit; and for
that point it cited only United States v. Lee,126 a case which was also
123. 202 U.S. 60 (1906).
124. Oregon's argument also asserted, as two "additional" grounds for federal ju•
risdiction, the other two possible bases which had been mentioned, but mooted, in
Minnesota-namely, the fact that the suit was between a state and citizens of other
states, and the fact that it arose under the laws of the United States. See 202 U.S.
at 64-65.
125. Noble v. Union River Logging R.R., 147 U.S. 165 (1893); United States v.
Schurz, 378 U.S. 196 (1880); Grisar v. McDowell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 363 (1867); Brown
v. Huger, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 305 (1858); Meigs v. M'Clung's Lessee, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch)
11 (1815).
126. 106 U.S. 196 (1882), discussed in te.xt accompanying note 20 supra.
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cited by Oregon and which was quite simply contrary to the Government's position. Counsel for defendants wisely devoted little of their
argument to sovereign immunity and went on to discuss other points.
The opinion which the Court finally handed down in Oregon v.
Hitchcock was a baffling distortion of kiinnesota v. Hitchcock. It
excerpted that portion of the earlier opinion which pertained to
"real party in interest" for purposes of federal jurisdiction, but it did
so in such a manner as to make it appear that the passage pertained to
sovereign immunity. It then asserted that the Court had sustained
jurisdiction in the ~Minnesota case only because the Act of March 2,
1901 had been held to be a waiver of immunity (an interpretation
which, as far as the enunciated opinion in Minnesota is concerned,
is simply false), 127 and had also been held to be an assumption by
the United States of "full responsibility in behalf of its wards, the
Indians, for the result of any suit affecting their rights" 128 (a statement which is quite true, but also quite irrelevant to the factual
situation in Oregon, in which the United States was clearly the real
party concerned because equitable title to the lands in question
was not held by the Indians). In view of the fact that seven of the
nine members of the Oregon Court had also sat in 1.v!innesota, and
in view of the fact that the two opinions were written by the same
Justice Qustice Brewer), it is difficult to avoid a suspicion that the
distortion of the earlier case was intentional and that the Court had
had some second thoughts about the scope of original-jurisdiction
litigation that it was inviting. Be that as it may, relying on its distortion of ~Minnesota, the Court held in Oregon that the action was
barred by sovereign immunity because the United States was the
real party in interest and had not given consent to be sued.
Oregon v. Hitchcock was, so far as this writer's research has been
able to disclose, the first occasion on which the sovereign immunity
doctrine was applied by the Supreme Court against a plaintiff suing
a federal official in a public-lands case. The strength of the holding,
moreover, is diluted by two considerations. First, the plaintiff in the
suit was attempting to maintain the apparently contradictory positions that the United States was a party for purposes of federal jurisdiction,129 but was not a party for purposes of sovereign immunity.
Second, the Court expressed a clear and entirely self-sufficient alterna127. See text accompanying notes 119-22 supra.
128. 202 U.S. at 70.
129. Oregon apparently felt it important to establish tbis ground of jurisdiction
because the Court had clearly indicated in tbe Minnesota case its reluctance to rely
upon other grounds. See text accompanying notes 104-09 supra.
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tive ground for the holding-namely, that until legal title, which still
remained in the United States, actually passed, "inquiry as to equitable rights comes within the cognizance of the Land Department." 130
These grounds of comfort were not present, however, in a case
decided the next month, Naganab v. Hitchcock. 131 That case, filed
in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia by a Chippewa
Indian, concerned a federal statute which had established a forest
reservation upon lands allegedly held in trust for the benefit of the
complainant and his tribe. The bill sought an injunction restraining
the Secretary of the Interior from enforcing the statute, which was
asserted to be unconstitutional, and a ·writ of mandamus requiring
the Secretary to execute the alleged trust in favor of the Indians.
In a very brief opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of
the bill on the ground that the sovereign immunity of the United
States had not been waived. The only case cited in support of the
holding was Oregon v. H itchcock. 132
In the same term, the new doctrine of sovereign immunity in
public-lands cases was arguably reaffirmed, and perhaps drastically
130. 202 U.S. at 70. For what is apparently the first action against a public-lands
official which employed this "passage of title" theory to preclude suit, see Brown v.
Hitchcock, 173 U.S. 473 (1899). The basic principle, as set forth in that case, was that
"so long as the legal title remains in the government all questions of right should be
solved by appeal to the land department and not to the courts." 173 U.S. at 477.
The prior and subsequent history of the doctrine enunciated in that case is as interesting, and as strewn with misconceptions, as that of sovereign immunity. For
present purposes it need only be noted that the Court began to display some defen•
siveness concerning the theory as early as 1908 [see Garfield v. United States ex rel.
Goldsby, 211 U.S. 249, 260 (1908)], and effectively repudiated it in 1917 [see Lane v.
Hoglund, 244 U.S. 174 (1917)]. Cases in direct opposition to the theory appeared
regnlarly after that [see, e.g., Payne v. Central Pac. Ry., 255 U.S. 228 {1921); Work v.
United States ex rel. McAlester-Edwards Co., 262 U.S. 200 (1923); Work v. Louisiana,
269 U.S. 250 (1925)], but the repudiation was never made explicit, nor were the earlier
cases applying the theory specifically overruled. The result is that the old cases remain alive and fertile, unsterilized by Shepard's, and capable of spawning confusion
for lawyers and judges who have neither time nor inclination to investigate the
history of the "passage of title" doctrine. Thus it is that the above quotation from
Brown, which has not been an accurate statement of the law for half a century, can
be dredged up to confuse the issue in as recent a case as Best v. Humboldt Placer
Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 338 (1963).
131. 202 U.S. 473 (1906).
132. Naganab should perhaps not even be considered a public-lands case, since it
relates to the functions of the United States as guardian of, and trustee for, the Indians.
Like the functions of managing and disposing of the public lands, those functions
happen to be performed by the Secretary of the Interior (though through the Bureau
of Indian Affairs rather than the Bureau of Land Management); but they really comprise a separate field of administration, and one which has given rise to its own stream
of litigation, not all of which pertains to real estate. Since, however, several of the
suits brought against the Secretary by Indians with respect to lands held for them are
referred to with some frequency in the public-lands opinions, such cases will, subject
to this caveat, be considered in this Article.
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extended, by the case of Kansas v. United States. 183 That case involved another attempt by a state at an original action in the
Supreme Court. The defendants were the United States, its officers,
and certain Indian allottees of lands which the state claimed had
previously been granted to it in trust for certain railroads. The Court
held that, insofar as the United States and its officers were concerned, the suit was one against the sovereign without its consent.134
In order to dispose of the suit as to the Indian allottees-whose
citizenship, Kansas had argued, would still suffice to confer subject
matter jurisdiction on the Court, since they were citizens of other
states-the Court stretched sovereign immunity still further. It held
that as to these defendants, too, the action was one against the
United States, since "if their allotments should be taken from them
... the United States would be subject to a demand from them for
the value thereof or for other lands ... .''135 This last proposition
appears to have had neither ancestors, nor, fortunately, progeny. It
may perhaps be explained, as indeed the entire application of
sovereign immunity in these public-lands cases may be explained,
as an unusual theory invoked only to avoid a claim upon the
Court's original jurisdiction. In any event, the precedential effect
of the Kansas case is weakened by the fact that there was again an
alternative ground for dismissal of the bill; indeed, that groundthat the state was not the real party in interest-was the first set
forth in the opinion.
The next important case, Louisiana v. Garfield,136 exemplifies
a curious, but not uncommon, variant of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. In another attempt to invoke the original jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court, the State of Louisiana had brought a bill
against the Secretary of the Interior to enjoin his disposition of certain land and to establish the state's title to it. The Attorney General
argued that the suit was against the United States without its consent, citing only the Aiinnesota, Oregon, Naganab, and Kansas cases.
The Court, however, in an opinion by Justice Holmes, made no
reference to those cases nor to the doctrine of sovereign immunity as
such, preferring instead to state that the case "raises questions of law
133. 204 U.S. 331 (1907).
1114. In support of this holding, the Court cited only Minnesota v. Hitchcock, Oregon
v. Hitchcock, and United States v. Lee-the last of which, as noted above, not only
offered no support for dismissal as to the officers, but positively militated against it.
See text following note 20 supra.
135. 204 U.S. at 342.
136. 211 U .s. 70 (1908).

898

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 68:867

and of fact upon which the United States would have to be heard," 137
wherefore "[i]t follows that the United States is a necessary party and
that we have no jurisdiction of this suit.'' 138 Justice Holmes did not
cite any authority for that holding. Its theoretical basis is certainly
contrary to a vast number of prior and subsequent cases involving
suits against government officials, and amounts, of course, to the
doctrine of sovereign immunity under a different sheet.139

C. The Withering Away of Immunity
In the same month as that in which Louisiana v. Garfield
was decided, the Court decided Garfield v. United States ex rel.
Goldsby. 140 The difference between the two opinions is suggestive
of the line which was beginning to develop. Goldsby involved a
petition for writ of mandamus against the Secretary of the Interior,
requiring him to restore the relator to enrollment as a member of
the Chickasaw Nation. That enrollment, which entitled the relator
to a share in the funds and lands belonging to the Nation, had been
cancelled without notice or hearing. The Supreme Court for the
District of Columbia granted the writ and the United States Supreme Court affirmed. Neither the Supreme Court nor-so far as
the official reports show-either counsel mentioned the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. The Court's decision might be explained on
the ground that the lands and funds in question were merely held
in trust by the United States for the Indians, who thus constituted
the real party in interest. But if that were the explanation, one
would expect the opinion to contain at least some explicit reference
to the crucial fact of trusteeship-which it does not. In light of the
later cases, it appears that the operative difference between Louisiana
v. Garfield and Goldsby lay in the fact that the latter case was not
an original action in the Supreme Court, but rather an ordinary
mandamus petition in the District of Columbia. The limitations
upon such an ordinary petition involving public lands were well
137. 211 U.S. at 70.
138. 211 U.S. at 77-78.
139. See 3 K. DAVIS, .ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 27.04, at 558 n.9 (1958); Block,
Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 59 HARV.
L. REv. 1060, 1064-66 (1946). Some authors have suggested that the "indispensable
party" theory ought to be separated from the sovereign immunity doctrine and be
given a useful life of its own. Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory"
Judicial Review: Sovereign Immunity, Indispensable Parties, .Mandamus, 75 HARv. L.
REV. 1479, 1491-93 (1962); H.M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1177-78 (1953).
140. 211 U.S. 249 (1908).
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established; they included the "ministerial-discretionary" test141 and
the "passage of title" concept,142 but did not include the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.148
Conley v. Ballinger, 144 decided slightly more than a year after
Goldsby, was an action for an injunction against the Secretary and
Commissioner to restrain them from selling or disturbing an Indian
cemetery. Although the case could have been disposed of in a few
lines if the principle of Naganab had been firmly adhered to, the
Court examined the merits and found that plaintiff had no legal or
equitable title. Dismissal of the bill therefore had to be affirmed
"even if the suit is not to be regarded as a suit against the United
States within the authority of [Naganab and Oregon v. Hitchcock.]"145 It is again to be noted that this case was not an original
action in the Supreme Court.
In Ballinger v. United States ex rel. Frost, 146 decided less than
a month later, the Court carried its lack of concern with the doctrine
of sovereign immunity a step further. The action had been brought
in the Supreme Court for the District of Columbia by a Choctaw
Indian who sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of
the Interior to deliver to her an executed patent which had been
recalled before delivery. The facts bore great resemblance to those
of United States v. Schurz, 141 a pre-Minnesota v. Hitchcock case in
which delivery of the executed patent had been compelled. The
Supreme Court affirmed a similar judgment in Frost, citing, among
other cases, Schurz, but not citing, just as counsel had apparently
141. See Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840).
142. See note 130 supra.
143. Naganab v. Hitchcock, discussed in text accompanying notes 131-32 supra,
appears to be the only case that is inconsistent with this theory-for in that case
sovereign immunity was held to bar suit in the District of Columbia for mandamus
and injunction. But that case is similarly inconsistent with the other possible reconciliation of Goldsby and Louisiana v. Garfield-that is, reliance upon the fiduciary
nature of the Government's ownership to explain the inapplicability of immunity in
Goldsby. The property at issue in Naganab was likewise held in trust for the com•
plainant's tribe; in fact in that case, unlike in Goldsby, the existence of a trust was
explicitly referred to in the Court's opinion. Moreover, in a case decided barely a
year after Goldsby, the Court cited Naganab to support the proposition that a trust
cannot be enforced against the United States, presumably because of sovereign immunity. Conley v. Ballinger, 216 U.S. 84, 90 (1910) (dictum), discussed in text accompanying notes 144-45 infra. The problem reduces itself, therefore, to whether
Goldsby or Naganab is the sport. The brevity of the opinion in Naganab makes
that case the more likely candidate.
144. 216 U.S. 84 (1910).
145. 216 U.S. at 91.
146. 216 U.S. 240 (1910).
147. 102 U.S. 378 (1880).
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not cited, any of the sovereign immunity cases discussed above.148
Indeed, neither the opinion of the Court nor the recorded arguments
of counsel made any reference to sovereign immunity. Rather, the
battle was fought on the familiar ground of the "mandamus-discretionary" test and the "passage of title" theory. Once again, however, the case was not an original action in the Supreme Court.
Subsequent cases continued the retreat from Oregon v. Hitchcock
and from Naganab, at first only in suits not seeking to invoke the
Court's original jurisdiction, but later in original-jurisdiction cases
as well. Thus, in United States ex rel. Ness v. Fischer, 149 the Court
affirmed a denial by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
of a petition for mandamus against the Secretary, but it used the traditional ground of "discretionary action" and ignored the argument
of sovereign immunity which the defendant had somewhat tentatively made.150 Similarly, in United States ex rel. Knight v. Lane,1r,1
the lower court's denial of a ·writ of mandamus against the Secretary
was affirmed, without reference to sovereign immunity, on the basis
of "discretionary action" and the "passage of title" theory. Again,
in Plested v. Abbey,152 the lower court's denial of a petition for a
restraining and mandatory injunction against federal land officers
was affirmed on the basis of the "passage of title" doctrine, without
reference to sovereign immunity. Indeed, in Plested both the recorded argument for the defendants and the opinion of the Court
cited the principal sovereign immunity cases-Oregon v. Hitchcock
and Naganab-along with Brown and Schurz as instances of application of the "passage of title" rulel 153 Finally, in Lane v. Watts,1r, 4
the Supreme Court not only affirmed the issuance of an injunction
against the Secretary and Commissioner,155 but also made its rejection of the argument of sovereign immunity explicit, citing Ballinger
v. United States ex rel. Frost and omitting any mention of the
skeletons in its closet such as Naganab. 156 Two years later, in Lane
148. The Attorney General did cite Oregon v. Hitchcock, but only for that case's
alternative holding which was based on the "passage of title" theory. 216 U.S. at 242.
149. 223 U.S. 683 (1912).
150. 223 U.S. at 688.
151. 228 U.S. 6 (1913).
152. 228 U.S. 42 (1913).
153. 228 U.S. at 46, 51.
154. 234 U.S. 525 (1914).
155. The lower court had enjoined those officials from allowing entries upon
certain lands which the plaintiffs claimed the Government had previously granted to
them. Lane v. Watts, 41 App. D.C. 139, 140 (D.C. Cir. 1913).
156. 234 U.S. at 536, 540.
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v. United States ex rel. Mickadiet, 151 the Court reversed the granting
of a ·writ of mandamus against the Secretary, but it did so on the
"passage of title" theory, despite the sovereign immunity argument
made by the Solicitor General. 158 The next year, in Lane v. Hoglund,169 the Court again ignored the Secretary's assertion of sovereign
immunity and this time affirmed the gTa.nting of a ·writ of mandamus
against him to compel action which had never before been held to
be within the courts' power-namely, execution and delivery of a
land patent which had not been executed. 160 The Court was not yet
prepared, however, to abandon the sovereign-immunity bar as it
applied to those public-lands cases brought before its original
jurisdiction. Thus, in New Mexico v. Lane, 161 it upheld the doctrine
in a public-lands case for the first time in over eight years, citing as
authority only Louisiana v. Garfield. 162 Sovereign immunity was,
however, only an alternative ground for the decision. The Court
also found that the beneficiary of the patent issuance which the suit
sought to enjoin was an indispensable party to the suit, and that
since he was presumably a New Mexico citizen his joinder would
destroy the diversity of citizenship which was the sole basis of
jurisdiction.163 The next year, in lviinnesota v. Lane, 164 the Court
157. 241 U.S. 201 (1916).
158. The opinion shows the same tendency as Plested v. Abbey, 228 U.S. 42 (1913),
to reduce sovereign immunity into the "passage of title" theory. The Court says:
There was a suggestion in argument, which it was conceded was not made in
the courts below, of an absolute want of jurisdiction upon the theory that as the
title of the allotted property was yet in the United States for the purposes of the
trust, there could in any event be no jurisdiction over the cause, since in substance and effect it was a suit against the United States. As, however, the considerations involved in this proposition were absolutely coincident with those required to be taken into view in order to determine the power of the Secretary,
we have not deemed it necessary to specially consider the subject.
2·H U.S. at 210.
159. 244 U.S. 174 (1917).
160. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 340-41 (1965); cf.
Brown v. Hitchcock, 173 U.S. 473, 476 (1899).
161. 243 U.S. 52 (1917).
162. 211 U.S. 70 (1908), discussed in text accompanying notes 136-39 supra.
163. 243 U.S. at 58. It is interesting, though upsetting, to observe that this argument brings us full circle from Minnesota v. Hitchcock. In that case the Court considered naming the Secretary equivalent to naming the United States so far as subject
matter jurisdiction was concerned, while not considering it equivalent for purposes of
sovereign immunity. See text accompanying note 118 supra. In the New Mexico case,
on the other hand, the Court considered naming the Secretary equivalent to naming
the United States so far as sovereign immunity was concerned, while not considering
it equivalent for purposes of subject matter jurisdiction. Panta rei.
It is unclear whether the Court's disregard of the possibility that the existence of a
federal question could provide federal jurisdiction in an original action was unintentional or calculated. Concerning this issue, see H.M. HART &: H. WECHSLER, THE FED:ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 225-27 (1953).
164. 247 U.S. 243 (1918).
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again refused to grant the issuance of an injunction in an original
action against the Secretary of the Interior, but this time the result
was based squarely upon the "passage of title" theory; the doctrine
of sovereign immunity was not even mentioned as an alternative
ground, nor were any of the cases supporting that doctrine cited.165
With Minnesota v. Lane, the states apparently got the message which the Court had been trying to convey to them ever since
Oregon first took the Court's opinion in Minnesota v. Hitchcock
at face value and tried to make original actions in the Supreme
Court the rule in state-initiated public-lands cases. The only consistent theme of that message was that the Court frowned upon such
actions. During the period between 1906 and 1918, the states had
lost all five of their attempted original actions, 166 some of them on
grounds which were either ignored or expressly or implicitly rejected by the Court in other cases during the same period. It is
poetically condign that the state which was responsible for the
war-that is, Minnesota, which obtained passage of the Act of
March 2, 1901 and evoked the unfortunate opinion which applied
it-should have fought and lost the war's last battle. Ever since
Minnesota v. Lane, no state has sought to bring an original publiclands action against the Secretary in the Supreme Court. It may be
added, by way of happy ending, that in both of the subsequent
Supreme Court cases involving attempts by states to achieve the
same ends through more normal, although more time-consuming,
procedures,167 the Court rewarded the plaintiffs, as worthy pupils
who had learned their lesson well, with success--even though the
Court purchased that reward at the expense of blatantly ignoring or
distorting the two theories (sovereign immunity and "passage of
title") which had previously been held determinative in the originaljurisdiction suits.168
165. This resort to the "passage of title" theory is evidence both of the
Court's determination to discourage original actions and of its continuing resolve to
withdraw from the Naganab concept of sovereign immunity in public-lands cases.
Only the previous year, the "passage of title" theory had been clearly (though tacitly)
repudiated, in Lane v. Hoglund, 244 U.S. 174 (1917), and it would continue to be
repudiated with regularity in the future. See note 130 supra.
166. Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 60 (1906); Kansas v. United States, 204 U.S. 331
(1907); Louisiana v. Garfield, 211 U.S. 70 (1908); New Mexico v. Lane, 243 U.S. 52
(1917); Minnesota v. Lane, 247 U.S. 243 (1918).
167. Payne v. New Mexico, 255 U.S. 367 (1921); Work v. Louisiana, 269 U.S. 250
(1925).
168. In Payne v. New Mexico, 255 U.S. 367 (1921), the Court made no reference
at all to either theory. In Work v. Louisiana, 269 U.S. 250 (1925), it ignored the
"passage of title" theory, but made a gallant, though clearly unsatisfactory, attempt
to avoid some of the sovereign-immunity cases. It distinguished Louisiana v. Garfield,
New Mexico v. Lane, and Minnesota v. Lane on the ground that those suits had as
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The last public-lands case-or at least arguably a public-lands
case160-in which the defense of sovereign immunity was sustained
by the Supreme Court was liforrison v. Work, 170 a suit for mandatory
injunction and general relief against the Secretary of the Interior,
the Commissioner of the General Land Office, the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, and the Secretary of the Treasury. As in Naganab v.
Hitchcock, 171 plaintiff was a Chippewa Indian from Minnesota
suing on behalf of himself and others similarly situated; and the
claim for relief was based on the same statute that had been at issue
their purpose to establish or to quiet the states' title, whereas the suit before the
Court sought merely to set aside the Secretary's ruling that he would not issue a
patent under the Swamp Lands Act unless and until the state should apply for a
hearing in which it would establish the nonoil and nongas character of the land in
question. In other words, it was, unlike the other cases, a suit merely to prevent the
Secretary from taking into account improper, and therefore illegal, factors in the
process of making his administrative determination. Of course, this distinction is
utterly nonfunctional. It would mean that one could enjoin the Secretary, while proceedings were still in progress, from taking improper factors into account; whereas
when the proceedings had been terminated and had resulted in a determination
against the complainant on the sole basis of an improper factor and with all other
factors adjudged in complainant's favor, the suit would have to be dismissed because of sovereign immunity if the bill sought reversal of the decision-but could
be entertained, presumably, if the bill sought only a rehearing before the Secretary in which all the proper factors already adjudged in complainant's favor would
be readjudged. The effect of this principle-in diametric opposition to the effect
of tl1e "passage of title" principle which the court ignored-is to make it advantageous to go before the courts prior to administrative finality. Such a principle in
fact had no support whatever in prior public-lands cases, although the three cases
which the Court used it to distingnish would happen to come out the way they did
if the principle were applied to them. To exemplify the numerous cases inconsistent
with this principle, it will suffice to refer to the immediately preceding suit in the
Supreme Court which involved state claims to public lands. The bill in Payne v. New
Mexico had sought an injunction against cancellation of a lieu land selection for any
reason. (That injunction is what the decree below had granted, and it would surely
have been wortliy of note if the decree had gone beyond the request of the bill.) The
effect of such a decree, as the Supreme Court's opinion in the case clearly indicates,
is to acknowledge that the state possesses equitable title. 255 U.S. at 371. The Supreme
Court, however, did not require the bill to be dismissed merely because it thus went
beyond preventing the Secretary from taking into account the single improper factor
on which he had based his cancellation. On the contrary, the Court went out of its
way to limit the decree to that single improper factor, since in that particular case
the Secretary evidently had not ruled upon other relevant factors; and it affirmed the
decree as so limited:
We conclude that an injunction was rightly awarded, but that it will be better
suited to the occasion if it be confined to directing a disposal of the selection in
regular course unaffected by the [improper factor which the Secretary had helddeterminative]. With this modification the decree is Affirmed.
255 U.S. at 373. Surely this limiting of the relief requested to sometliing "better
suited to the occasion" is utterly inconsistent with the Court's explanation in Work
v. Louisiana tliat sovereign immunity applies when the complainant seeks more than
be ought' to be given. For other cases to the same effect on this point as Payne v.
New l1fexico, see Payne v. Central Pac. Ry., 255 U.S. 228 (1921); Wilbur v. United
States ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306 (1930).
169. See note 132 supra.
170. 266 U.S. 481 (1925).
171. 202 U.S. 473 (1906), discussed in text accompanying notes 131-32 supra,
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in the earlier case.m The Court's opinion, written by Justice
Brandeis, is divided into three parts:
First. The four grounds of complaint which rest upon the charge
that the defendants are depriving these Chippewas of their property
by carrying out the provisions of the six later acts of Congress, have
this in common. Each complaint relates to some change made either
in the method of managing and disposing of the ceded lands or in
the disposition 0£ the proceeds thereof. As to each, it is claimed that
the defendants' acts are unlawful because Congress was powerless to
make the change without the consent of the Chippewas.113

As to these grounds, the Court held that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity barred the suit.174
Second. The three grounds 0£ complaint which rest upon charges
that the defendants, acting under color 0£ authority granted by the
Act of 1889, have inflicted and threaten injury by the exercise of
powers not conferred, have this in common. Each complaint involves
the charge that the officials have erred either in construing or in
applying that act and the agreements approved March 4, 1890.175

The Court's description of its reasons for sustaining dismissal of
the bill with respect to these grounds of objection is as follows:
The bill was properly dismissed, so far as concerns these three charges,
because the plaintiff is not in a position to litigate in this proceeding
the legality of the acts complained of.176
[T]he right 0£ the Indians is merely to have the United States administer properly the trust assumed. It resembles the general right of
every citizen to have the Government administered according to law
and the public moneys properly applied. [The Court here cites,
among other cases, Massachusetts v. Mellon. 177] Courts have no
power, under the circumstances here presented, to interfere with the
performance of the functions committed to an executive department
0£ the Government by a suit to which the United States is not, and
cannot be made, a party.178
Except for the oblique reference in the last sentence quoted, that
portion of the Court's opinion which is devoted to this second
group of complaints does not even mention sovereign immunity.
172. Act of Jan. 14, 1889, 25 Stat. 642.
173. 266 U.S. at 485.
174. 266 U.S. at 486. The Court used the "indispensable party'' circumlocution,
mentioned above in connection with Justice Holmes' opinion in Louisiana v. Garfield, 211 U.S. 70 (1908). See text accompanying note 139 supra.
175. 266 U.S. at 486.
176. 266 U.S. at 486.
177. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
178. 266 U.S. at 488.
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The entire discussion is directed to the point of standing, and the
last sentence is perhaps best explained as Justice Brandeis' subtle
way of implying that in the past the doctrine of sovereign immunity
had often been applied to secure ends which could be achieved more
properly and directly through the recently expanded principles
of standing. 179
The final section of the Court's opinion deals with those portions
of the bill which sought to compel the Secretary of the Interior
to grant to the Red Lake Indians certain allotments to which they
were allegedly entitled. The plaintiff was not a Red Lake Indian
and laid no claim to an allotment. His interest in the Secretary's
performance of his duty was more remote. The statute requiring
the allotments180 had reserved for that purpose some 700,000 acres
of land, an amount greatly in excess of what would be necessary.
After the allotments had been completed, the remainder of the
reserved acreage was to become part of tribal lands which the
United States was under an obligation to sell for the benefit of all
the Chippewas in Minnesota, among whom was numbered the plaintiff. As to these portions of the bill, the Court found that there had
been shown both insufficient interest on the part of the plaintiff
and insufficient equity to warrant a mandatory injunction, which,
"like a mandamus, is an extraordinary remedial process which is
179. The landmark case in the area of standing, Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S.
•!77 (1923), had been decided only two years before Morrison. The Morrison Court's
apparent reference to sovereign immunity in its statement that courts lack power to
interfere with the performance of executive functions "by a suit to which the United
States is not, and cannot be made, a party," was prefaced by the words "under the
circumstances here presented." The circumstances to which the Court referred must
have been those circumstances which had been treated at length in the portion of the
opinion to which that sentence forms the conclusion-that is, the circumstances
establishing lack of standing.
That Justice Brandeis was attempting to convert into "lack of standing" much of
what earlier cases would have called "sovereign immunity" is further supported by an
examination of his statement that, "if through officials of the United States these lands,
or the proceeds thereof, or the accruing interest, are improperly disposed of, it is the
United States, not the officials, which is under obligation to account to the Indians
therefor." 255 U.S. at 487-88. That statement is almost the classic prologue to a
sovereign immunity holding. It is usually followed by a sentence such as: "But the
United States has not been made a party to this suit, nor can it be, since it has not
given the requisite consent." See, e.g., Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U.S.
871, 374-75 (1945). In Morrison, however, to the reader's surprise and confusion, the statement is followed by a totally different progression of thought: "In other words, the right of
the Indians is merely to have the United States administer properly the trust assumed.
It resembles the general right of every citizen to have the government administered
according to law and the public monies properly applied." 225 U.S. at 488. The opinion
then cites Massachusetts v. Mellon, which had held that persons possessing such
a "general right" could not enforce it against the Government, not because of sovereign immunity, but because of lack of standing.
180. General Allotment Act of Feb. 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388.
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granted, not as a matter of right, but in the exercise of a sound
judicial discretion. "1s1
It is of more than passing interest that the Court chose to dissect
the case as it did, applying the doctrine of sovereign immunity only
to the claims of unconstitutional congressional action. If the Court
had decided not to follow the more recent public-lands cases which
ignored sovereign immunity, then surely it could have made its
task much simpler by applying the doctrine to the entire suit. Why
the Court chose the more intricate approach is difficult to surmise.
Perhaps it felt unable to follow the more recent public-lands cases
in the face of Naganab, which was so close in point, involving the
same central issue and the same class of plaintiffs. However, since
N aganab happened to deal with alleged unconstitutionality of congressional action (although the opinion in the case made nothing
of that factor), it could be followed on that narrow ground without
unduly expanding sovereign immunity and without actually contradicting the more recent decisions that ignored the doctrine. On the
other hand, if the object was merely to sterilize Naganab, that could
have been achieved more simply and more effectively, it seems,
by avoiding the sovereign immunity issue entirely. The defect in
standing, on the basis of which the Court disposed of the second
grounds of complaint, appears to have existed with respect to the
first and third as well182-so that Morrison could have been disposed of as easily on that single basis as on the single basis of
sovereign immunity. It may be, then, that Justice Brandeis' intricate
opinion must be regarded not as an attempt to limit the precedential
effect of Naganab in public-lands cases, but rather as an ambitious
effort to adjust the role of sovereign immunity in all its applications
so that it would be relied upon, when appropriate, only to insulate
the legislative branch from judicial interference. Under that interpretation, the protection of the executive branch would be achieved
by other devices, such as (1) the well-established ministerialdiscretionary dichotomy-which was referred to explicitly, but
mooted, in both the second and third portions of the opinion; (2)
181. 266 U.-S. at 490. At least the equity point is a trifle difficult to accept. The
allotments were to have been made "as soon as practicable" after the taking of a census of the Red Lake Indians. Although that census had been taken thirty-two years
before the filing of the complaint in the case, no allotments had yet been made. 266
U.S. 481, 489 (1925).
182. The last sentence of the first portion of the opinion indicates that bases other
than sovereign immunity could have been used to reach the same result: "The bill, so
far as it complains of acts done pursuant to the later legislation, 'Was properly dismissed for this reason [i.e., sovereign immunity], among others." 266 U.S. at 486
(emphasis added).
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the principle of standing-which was the basis used for the second
portion of the opinion, and was explicitly mentioned, but mooted,
in the third-perhaps expanded to cover many cases formerly
disposed of on the ground of sovereign immunity; 183 and (3) a
greater emphasis upon the "discretionary" character of mandamus
and injunctive relief-which was the basis used for the third portion
of the opinion.184 This explanation, unlike the first, is consistent
with the fact that the Morrison opinion cites such a large number
of non-public lands cases; 185 it would of course do so if it was attempting to bring a new principle of order into the whole field of
sovereign immunity. If that was the attempt, it certainly failed, for
Morrison has disappeared into the faceless crowd of inconsistent and
irreconcilable cases on sovereign immunity.
It might be well at this point to summarize the developments
which have heretofore been described in some detail. The doctrine
of sovereign immunity was apparently not used by the Supreme Court
in cases against public-lands officials until 1906, when Oregon v.
Hitclzcock186 distorted the earlier holding of Minnesota v. Hitchcock,181 which in tum had been spawned by that unhappy statute,
the Act of March 2, 1901.188 The doctrine was later applied in only
five other public-lands cases.189 Of the six cases, three used the
sovereign-immunity doctrine as the basis of merely alternative hold183. See note 179 supra.
184. It is not suggested that the Court in Morrison was proposing a system of

separation of powers as rigid as, for example, the French, under which, in practice if
not in principle, no legislative action and virtually all executive action is reviewable by
the courts. See F. RIDLEY &: J. BLONDEL, PUBUC ADMINISTRATION IN FRANCE 128-30
(1964). Rather, the point is merely that the Court in 'Morrison may have been seeking
to take one step in that direction by eliminating the "jurisdictional" defense of
sovereign immunity entirely with respect to challenges of executive action, while retaining it for some cases, though not requiring it always, when legislative action is at
issue. That the Morrison Court was concerned with the differing nature of its roles
vis-a-vis the legislative branch on the one hand and the executive on the other, may
be seen in the following excerpt from the opinion of the identical Court in Massachusetts v. Mellon:
The general rule is that neither department [i.e., of the legislative, executive and
judicial] may invade the province of the other, and neither may control, direct, or
restrain the action of the other. We are not now speaking of the merely ministerial
duties of officials.
262 U.S. at 488.
185. 266 U.S. at 487-88.
186. See note 123-30 supra and accompanying text.
187. See notes 95-122 supra and accompanying text.
188. 31 Stat. 950 (1901), discussed in text accompanying notes 96-101 supra.
189. Naganab v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 473 (1906); Kansas v. United States, 204 U.S.
lllll (1907): Louisiana v. Garfield, 211 U.S. 70 (1908); New Mexico v. Lane, 243 U.S.
52 (1917); Morrison v. Work, 266 U.S. 481 (1925).
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ings.190 I£ one excludes as being sui generis-at least when they were
decided-those actions which sought to invoke the original jurisdiction of the Court,191 the number of cases applying sovereign
immunity is reduced to two; 192 and if there are also excluded, as
presenting special considerations, suits by Indians involving tribal
lands193-or for that matter, even just Minnesota Chippewa tribal
lands-the number is reduced to zero. Four of the six cases were
decided between 1906 and 1908.194 One of the remaining two,
decided in 1917, was an original-jurisdiction case in which the
sovereign-immunity holding was merely an alternative ground.10u
The last, decided in 1925, was a tribal-lands case that produced
a peculiarly narrow application of the doctrine,1 96 and can perhaps
be explained as a decision which wandered from the re-established
path of public-lands cases either because of the strong stare decisis
effect of an earlier case involving the same parties and subject
matter, or because it was seeking that juristic Fountain of Youth-a
rationale which would explain and control the doctrine of sovereign
immunity in all its applications. With the exception of those two
last-mentioned cases, all of the many Supreme Court decisions which
have been rendered since 1908 in suits seeking specific relief against
public-lands officials consist of holdings explicitly rejecting the
doctrine of sovereign immunity,197 of holdings constituting a clear
implicit rejection of the doctrine (sometimes ignoring the defendants' express argument that the doctrine applies), 108 and of rulings
denying the plaintiff relief upon other grounds, without mention of
sovereign immunity, even though that doctrine would have pro190. Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 60 (1906); Kansas v. United States, 204 U.S. 331
(1907); New Mexico v. Lane, 243 U.S. 52 (1917).
191. Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 60 (1906); Kansas v. United States, 204 U.S.
331 (1907); Louisiana v. Garfield, 211 U.S. 70 (1908); New Mexico v. Lane, 243 U.S.
52 (1917).
192. Naganab v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 473 (1906); Morrison v. Work, 266 U.S. 481
(1925).
193. See note 132 supra.
194. Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 60 (1906); Naganab v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 473
(1906); Kansas v. United States, 204 U.S. 331 (1907); Louisiana v. Garfield, 211 U.S. 70
(1908).
195. New Mexico v. Lane, 243 U.S. 52 (1917).
196. Morrison v. Work, 266 U.S. U.S. 481 (1925).
197. Lane v. Watts, 234 U.S. 525 (1914); Payne v. Central Pac. Ry., 255 U.S. 228
(1921); Work v. Louisiana, 269 U.S. 250 (1925).
198. Garfield v. Goldsby, 211 U.S. 249 (1908); Lane v. Hoglund, 244 U.S. 174 (1917);
Payne v. New Mexico, 255 U.S. 367 (1921); Santa Fe Pac. R.R. v. Fall, 259 U.S. 197
(1922); Work v. United States ex rel. McAlester-Edwards Co., 262 U.S. 200 (1923); Wilbur
v. United States ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306 (1930); Ickes v. Virginia-Colorado Dev.
Corp., 295 U.S. 639 (1935); Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 U.S. 86 (1949),
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vided a clear and usually simpler method of achieving the same
result.100

III.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing history suggests an answer to the problems posed
at the beginning of this Article. The reason that Udall v. Tallman 200
considered utterly irrelevant that issue of sovereign immunity which
Malone v. Bowdoin201 had considered utterly dispositive is simply
that the former was a public-lands case. It may well be that the
Larson case,202 described in Malone as "cutting through the tangle
of previous decisions," 203 has finally enunciated a unifying theory of
sovereign immunity which the Court will stand by in future suits
against government officers-although one must tolerate, if not entertain, a large degree of skepticism on that point, since both United
States v. Lee204 and Morrison v. Work 205 also posed as Great Watersheds, only to be ultimately eroded. But however solid and permanent that unifying theory may be, it will not be applied to the area of
nonstatutory review of public-lands determinations. The accumulated mass of decisional law in this area contrary to Larson is too
overwhelming; and in the conflict, it is the general rather than the
specific, the theoretical rather than the practical, the abstract thesis
rather than the historical actuality, which will yield. I list in a footnote a number of the major public-lands cases prior to Larson which
are simply inconsistent with its theory. 206 Since Larson, that theory
199. Ballinger v. United States ex rel. Frost, 216 U.S. 240 (1910); United States
ex rel. Ness v. Fisher, 223 U.S. 683 (1912); United States ex rel. Knight v. Lane, 228
U.S. 6 (1913); Plested v. Abbey, 228 U.S. 42 (1913); Lane v. United States ex rel.
Mickadiet, 241 U.S. 201 (1916); Upited States ex rel. Alaska Smokeless Coal Co. v.
Lane, 250 U.S. 549 (1919); United States ex rel. Hall v. Payne, 254 U.S. 343 (1920);
Southern Pac. R.R. v. Fall, 257 U.S. 460 (1922); Brady v. Work, 263 U.S. 435 (1924);
West v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 200 (1929); United States ex rel. McLennan v.
Wilbur, 283 U.S. 414 (1931); Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354 (1941); Chapman v.
Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co., 338 U.S. 621 (1950); Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co.,
371 U.S. 334 (1963); Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472 (1963); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S.
1 (1965).
200. 380 U.S. 1 (1965), discussed in text accompanying notes 33-55 supra.
201. 369 U.S. 643 (1962), discussed in text accompanying notes 15-20, 30-32 supra.
202. Larson v. Domestic &: Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949), discussed in text
accompanying notes 21-29 supra.
203. 369 U.S. at 647.
204. 106 U.S. 196 (1882), discussed in text following note 20 supra.
205. 266 U.S. 481 (1925), discussed in text accompanying notes 169-85 supra.
206. United States v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378 (1880) (mandamus to deliver patent);
Ballinger v. Frost, 216 U.S. 240 (1910) (same); Lane v. Watts, 234 U.S. 252 (1914) (injunction against approval of homestead entries); Lane v. Hoglund, 244 U.S. 174 (1917)
(mandamus to issue and deliver patent); Payne v. Central Pac. Ry., 255 U.S. 228 (1921)

(injunction against cancellation of selection of indemnity lands); Payne v. New Mexico,
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has. been applied to cases involving such nonroutine matters as (1) the
claim that land which the United States purported to own had
actually come to it through a grantor who held no more than a life
estate,207 (2) the claim that officials of the Bureau of Reclamation, in
their operation of a dam project, were depriving plaintiffs of water
rights,208 and (3) the claim that the Hawaii Statehood Act entitled
that state to those unneeded federal lands which the United States
had acquired through purchase, condemnation, or gift.200 In contrast,
the theory of Larson has not been applied, or even mentioned, in any
of the five Supreme Court cases since 1949 concerning the ordinary
administration of the public-lands.210 One of those cases, involving
255 U.S. 367 (1921) (injunction against cancellation of lieu land selection); Santa Fe
Pac. R.R. v. Fall, 259 U.S. 197 (1922) (same); Work v. United States ex rel. McAlester-Edwards Co., 262 U.S. 200 (1923) (mandamus to approve and deliver patent); Work v.
Louisiana, 269 U.S. 250 (1925) (restraining order and mandatory injunction, preventing
denial of patent on one particular ground); Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Krushnic,
280 U.S. 306 (1930) (mandamus requiring disposition of patent application without
regard to particular unlawful factor); Ickes v. Virginia-Colorado Dev. Corp., 295 U.S.
639 (1935) (mandatory injunction requiring vacating of adverse proceedings and of
decision declaring placer claim,s void); Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 U.S. 86 (1949)
(injuncton against seizing ships for alleged violation of Indian fishing waters). In all
of these cases, the officer would have had authority to do what he did if he had been
correct as to the determination of fact or law which the plaintiff challenged; and the
determination, moreover, was one which the officer had the primary responsibility of
making. Thus, Larson would have considered the action within the scope of the officer's
authority, even though erroneous. Moreover, since all but the first of these cases were
decided after the Court of Claims Act had been amended to allow suits founded "upon
the Constitution," the action in question in each of them, even assuming that it constituted a "taking" of property, could have been no more unconstitutional than that
in Larson or Malone. Perhaps some of the cases may be distinguished upon narrow
grounds which the opinions themselves did not consider determinative; but the cumulative effect of all of them is undeniably against Larson.
207. Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962).
208. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); City of Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 628
(1963).
209. Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57 (1963). A fascinating oddity of this opinion is
that in addition to citing the most recent and authoritative decisions upholding
sovereign immunity-namely, Larson, Malone, and Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963)the Court selected for mention only one other of the vast multitude of sovereignimmunity cases: Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 60 (1906). While this may have been
a coincidence, it may have had something to do with the fact that Oregon v. Hitchcock
was the first of that series of cases which employed the doctrine of sovereign immunity
to bar original actions in the Supreme Court. See text accompanying note 166 supra.
Hawaii v. Gordon was also an attempted original action.
210. Chapman v. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co., 338 U.S. 621 (1950) (denial of injunction against leasing of coal-mining rights); Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co.,
371 U.S. 334 (1963) (denial of injunction against administrative proceedings to determine the validity of mining claims-not really a typical public-lands case); Boesche
v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472 (1963) (denial of injunction against cancellation of mineral
lease); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. I (1965) (denial of mandamus to issue oil and gas
leases); United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599 (1968) (denial of mandamus to issue
mineral patent). In the last-cited case, the relief sought against the federal official
was requested by way of counterclaim in an ejectment action initiated by the United
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mining claims, contains a dictum describing the state of the law as
follows: "Claimants today may appeal the Examiner's decision to the
Director of the Bureau ... , from him to the Secretary ... , and from
there to the courts."211 Perhaps even more significantly, the lower
federal courts have, since Larson, continued with regularity to grant
specific relief against governmental officers with respect to publiclands matters. 212
States. Since, however, that relief went beyond what could be considered a set-off
against the Government's recovery, the availability of the sovereign immunity defense
would not seem to be affected by the counterclaim factor. See National Bank
v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955); United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940);
Nassau Smelting &: Ref. Works v. United States, 266 U.S. IOI (1924).
2II. Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 338 n.7 (1963). The only
authority cited for the availability of judicial review was a federal court of appeals
case which, like Best itself, made no mention whatsoever of the problem of sovereign
immunity: Foster v. Seaton, 271 F.2d 836 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
212. Holdings to this effect have issued from all three of the United States courts
of appeals which handle the vast majority of public-lands cases. From the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit have come: McKay v. Wahlenmaier, 226
F.2d 35 (1955) (mandamus affirmed directing cancellation of one oil and gas lease and
issuance of another; dissent specifically refers to Larson); McNeil v. Seaton, 281 F.2d
931 (1960) (Secretary's attempted alteration of plaintiff's preference rights under the
Taylor Grazing Act declared void; sovereign immunity argument explicitly rejected);
Pressentin v. Seaton, 284 F.2d 195 (1960) (Secretary directed to consider mining
claimant's appeal which had been determined to have been filed too late under the
applicable regulation); Brown v. Udall, 335 F.2d 706 (1964) (declaratory judgment
that Secretary's basis for rejection of mineral lease application was invalid). From the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit have come: Adams v. Witmer, 271 F.2d 29
(19.58) (injunction and mandatory affirmative relief to prevent cancellation of mining
claims granted, reversing lower court's determination that sovereign immunity barred
suit); Coleman v. United States, 363 F.2d 190 (1966), afjd. on rehearing, 379 F.2d 555
(1967), revd. on other grounds, 390 U.S. 599 (1968) (judgment on counterclaim, setting
aside Secretary's invalidation of mining claims; see note 210 supra); Tagala v. Gorsuch,
4II F.2d 589 (1969) (reversal of Secretary's decision automatically dismissing appeal
of homestead cancellation because of lateness in filing the appeal under the applicable Regulation; remanded to Director of Bureau of Land Management for exercise
of his discretion). Federal district court cases in the Ninth Circuit granting relief
against public-lands officials include: Stewart v. Penny, 238 F. Supp. 821 (D. Nev.
1965) (judgment for plaintiff in suit to reverse Secretary's decision cancelling homestead entry and to enjoin threatened eviction); Richardson v. Udall, 253 F. Supp.
72 (D. Idaho 1966) (decision of Secretary rejecting homestead application set aside,
and case remanded to Secretary for further consideration); Denison v. Udall, 248
F. Supp. 942 (D. Ariz. 1965) (decision of Solicitor of Department of Interior denying
mineral patent applications reversed, and case remanded to Department for further
proceedings). From the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has come: Foster v.
Udall, 335 F.2d 828 (1964) (suit to enjoin Secretary's rejection of mineral lease offer
and his issuance of lease to another private party; summary judgment for defendant
reversed). But cf. Chournos v. United States, 335 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1964) (a puzzling
opinion, which in some parts seems to sustain a defense of sovereign immunity with
respect to the officer-defendant, but which, in view of its last two sentences, must be
explained as an application of the "indispensable superior" doctrine). There have
been numerous cases since Larson in which the courts of appeals, while finding for
the federal officer, have done so on a ground that is much more difficult to establish
than sovereign immunity and have either explicitly rejected or completely ignored
the availability of the sovereign immunity defense: District of Columbia -Circuit: .Cal-
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The correct conclusion to be drawn from this discussion may be
an even more general one: Neither Larson, nor any other theory
which purports to provide a universally valid standard for the applicability of sovereign immunity to suits against federal officials,
can or will be followed unless it either rejects sovereign immunity
entirely or contains an exclusionary factor based plainly and simply
ifornia Co. v. Udall, 296 F.2d 384 (1961); Safarik v. Udall, 304 F.2d 944, cert. denied,
371 U.S. 901 (1962); Morgan v. Udall, 306 F.2d 799, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 941 (1962);
Miller v. Udall, 307 F.2d 676 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 967 (1963); Thor-Westcliffe
Dev., Inc. v. Udall, 314 F.2d 257, cert. denied, 373 U.S. 951 (1963); Miller v. Udall,
349 F.2d 193 (1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 929 (1966). Ninth Circuit: Pease v. Udall,
332 F.2d 62 (1964); Udall v. Battle Mountain Co., 385 F.2d 90 (1967), cert. denfrd, 390
U.S. 957 (1968). Tenth Circuit: Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Udall, 352 F.2d 32
(1965); Mecham v. Udall, 369 F.2d 1 (1966); Brennan v. Udall, 379 F.2d 803, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 975 (1967) (explicit rejection of sovereign immunity).
A Fifth Circuit case which does apply the doctrine of sovereign immunity to
bar a public-lands action is Ward v. Humble Oil &:: Ref. Co., 321 F.2d 775 (1963). The
nature of the action was such, however, that it was far from the "classic" suit for
review of a public-lands determination. The plaintiff was not seeking to obtain
reversal of any particular denial by the Secretary, but rather was demanding that
the Secretary cancel leases to third persons on the ground that those leases clouded
the title to the land, which the plaintiff alleged already belonged to him. Although
underlying the case was a determination by the Secretary that the plaintiff had
not acquired valid title through Mississippi under the Swamp Lands Act, the litigation
on its face resembled less the classic public-lands action for review of a patent denial or
a lease denial by the Bureau of Land Management than it did the Malone case, in which
a private citizen was trying to eject governmental officers from land which he claimed
belonged to him; the essence of the plaintiff's grievance was not that officers had
denied him a grant to which he was entitled, but rather that they were interfering
with land which he already owned. In addition to this fact that the suit did not have the
smell of a public-lands case, it might also be urged that it did not present a characteristic situation for application of the Administrative Procedure Act [hereinafter APA],
which is the usual modern excuse for ignoring Larson. See the last paragraph of the
Appendix following this Article. A similar Fifth Circuit case is Simons v. Vinson, 394
F.2d 732, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 968 (1968).
Finally, in this discussion of lower court cases, there may be mentioned White
v. Administrator of Gen. Servs. Admn., 343 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1965), which strongly
supports the thesis set forth above that it is only in the classic "nonstatutory review"
cases that Larson will be ignored. The plaintiffs in White, successful bidders for the
purchase of United States real estate administered by the General Services Administra•
tion, claimed that the deed that was tendered to them did not conform to the
invitation for bids which had issued. They sought mandamus requiring defendants to
execute a proper deed, and they also sought declaratory relief and relief "under the
Administrative Procedure Act." The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, despite
its holding in Adams v. Witmer, supra-which has become something of a leading case
-and despite its failure to make any reference to sovereign immunity in its decisions
cited in this footnote, held that sovereign immunity precluded all relief, including the
declaratory judgment and the relief under the APA.
The object of the appellants in the instant suit is to get the title out of the
United States and into the appellants. A suit with such an objective is a suit for
specific performance, regardless of what may be said in the complaint which initiates the suit. And, the title to the interest which the court is asked to order
to be conveyed to the appellants being now in the United States, the order would
have to be made against the United States. It follows that the United States would
have to be a party to the suit.
343 F.2d at 445. Obviously, the same "object ••• to get the title out of the United
States" existed in Adams v. Witmer and exists in almost every conventional public-lands
case; yet relief was, and is, accorded.
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upon historical prescription. There are clearly areas of federal administration in which the entire fabric of judicial review is woven
upon the frame of Davis v. Gray 213-that is, based upon the assumption that a suit against the officer cannot constitute a suit against the
sovereign. The Bureau of Land Management is one of those areas;
another is the Post Office Department. Cases seeking to reverse the
postal service's refusal either to deliver certain mail or to accord
particular postage rates constitute an "existential" category as distinct and as well-known as the public-lands cases. Moreover, since
the delivery of the federal mails, like the granting of interests in the
federal lands, began under the Continental Congress, that category
likewise stretches well back into the era before statutory provision
for judicial review of administrative action became customary.214
In this area also, the gap was filled by the use of traditional privatelaw actions against individual officers, without a thought that sovereign immunity could be a bar.215 Post-office cases form an important
213. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203 (1872). See text at note 85 supra.
214. The Continental Congress established a General Post Office for the United
Colonies on July 26, 1775, with Benjamin Franklin as the first Postmaster General.
Article IX of the Articles of Confederation provided for the establishment of a
Federal Post Office. See H. KONWISER, COLONIAL AND REvOLUTIONARY Posrs 49-55 (1931).
It did not take long for post-office cases to appear as a regular part of the Supreme
Court's business. One of the earliest was argued, and lost, by Francis Scott Key. Dunlop v. Munroe, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 242 (1812) (suit against postmaster for negligence
in losing mail).
215. See, e.g., Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838)
(mandamus): Teal v. Felton, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 284 (1851) (trover); United States ex rel.
McLean v. Vilas, 124 U.S. 86 (1888) (mandamus): American School of Magnetic Healing
v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902) (injunction).
Supreme Court cases involving the Post Office were numerous during the nine•
teenth century, but the vast majority of them were either actions by the United States
and its officials [e.g., Post Master General v. Early, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 136 (1827)
(action of debt on postmaster's bond); United States v. Mills, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 138 (1833)
(criminal action for violation of post-office laws); Brown v. United States, 50 U.S.
(9 How.) 487 (1850) (action upon account against former treasurer of Post Office Department)], or else actions for money damages by persons providing goods or services
to the Post Office [e.g., Garfield v. United States, 93 U.S. 242 (1876) (action upon
contract to carry mails); Chicago &: N.W. Ry. v. United States, 104 U.S. 680 (1881)
(same)]. The latter type of case presented no jurisdictional problem after enactment
in 1855 of the Court of Claims Act, 10 Stat. 612. Prior to that time, relief upon such
claims was generally sought through private bills in Congress. Cf. Kendall v. United
States ex rel. Stokes, supra.
Not until the early years of the present century does there begin the well-known
line of Supreme Court cases which seek mandamus or injunction against post-office
officials in order to overcome their allegedly incorrect interpretation of the mail-carriage statutes and their consequent refusal either to deliver certain material or to
accord it preferred rates. See, e.g., Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497 (1904);
United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Dem. Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921);
Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946); Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370
U.S. 478 (1962). American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94
(1902), which was the earliest of these cases, cited no judicial precedent in support of
its holding except public-lands cases. The same goal, however, namely, judicial review
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part of our body of administrative law. If it was a public-lands case
which established the principle, so determinative of the future development of nonstatutory review, that United States courts outside of
the District of Columbia did not possess the power of mandamus,216
it was a post-office case which established the equally critical principle
that the courts in the District of Columbia did possess that power.217
It was a post-office case which is considered to have given the first
clear expression to the "presumption of reviewability" of administrative action. 218 Regardless of what Larson said, an alteration by the
Supreme Court of this ancient and important line of cases, which
would thereby force congressional adoption, at this late date, of a
"statutory review" provision for the Post Office Department, must
certainly be regarded as extremely unlikely,219 if not utterly inconof the administrat.:irs' interpretation of the mail-carriage statutes, had been achieved
by another form of action in Teal v. Felton, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 284 (1851); and the
history of that case suggests a likely explanation for the scarcity of nineteenth-century
Supreme Court cases involving nonstatutory review of postal-rate and "mailability"
determinations. Teal was a trover action against a postmaster in Syracuse, New York,
to recover the value of a newspaper which he refused to deliver because of allegedly
incorrect postage. At issue was whether the printing on the newspaper wrapper of a
letter or initial, distinct from the address, could, as the defendant postmaster claimed,
subject a newspaper to ordinary letter-rate postage. In trial before a justice of the
peace for Onondaga County, the plaintiff recovered damages of $.06 plus $2.89 costs.
The case was removed by certiorari to the Onondaga County Court of Common Pleas,
which affirmed the judgment and raised the costs to $22.95. Appeal was then taken
to the Supreme Court of New York, which again affirmed, adding $37.60 costs, for a
total of $60.55. Review was then sought in the New York Court of Appeals, which
once again affirmed, giving judgment for $75.64-thus making a total of $136.19, of
which Sl36.13 were costs and $.06 were damages. The indefatigable defendant also lost
his appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, but the opinion regrettably
does not show what court costs were added to the $.06 at that stage. It should be
obvious that, leaving aside the possibility of an occasional "grudge-suit," only a largescale commercial enterprise, having both a requirement for recurrent use of the mails
and a requirement for continuation of the assertedly nonmailable or rate-increasing
contents, would find it worthwhile to incur court costs, not to mention attorneys'
fees, so disproportionate to the value of the particular mailing, instead of merely
deleting the objectionable material in subsquent mailings. Such a confluence of commercial size, reliance upon the mails, and crucial contested material was not likely
to occur often in earlier years.
216. M'Intire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (l Cranch) 504 (1813).
217. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
218. American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902). See
L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcrION 339 (1965).
219. See Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269 (1949), a case decided less than half a year
after Larson, affirming an injunction against a mail fraud order. It is true that this
case, like most other post-office cases in which relief is granted against the administrator, might be considered to fall within the "unconstitutional action" exception of
Larson. However, if the Court's jurisdiction (sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional
defect-see text at note 50 supra) had been based upon the unconstitutionality of the
Postmaster General's action, surely there should have been a finding of such unconstitutionality, which there was not. There was not even explicit mention of
unconstitutionality, much less a mention of sovereign immunity as the barrier which
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ceivable.220
A third field of federal administration in which the operation
of the foregoing thesis has been evident is, not surprisingly, that
of tax collection. This is a federal function which began slightly
more recently than that of delivering mail and granting interests
in land, since the Articles of Confederation conferred no taxing
power upon the federal government. It is nevertheless an activity
quite old enough, and obviously quite important enough, to have
confronted the courts with the same problem of controlling administrative abuse in the absence of any modern "statutory review"
procedures. In this area again, the solution devised from the very
beginning was the use of traditional common-law actions against
the individual federal officers, with no concern for the obstacle of
sovereign immunity.221 The common-law action against the Collector
-later the District Director-of Internal Revenue for money had
and received, as a means of correcting an improper assessment, endured until it was specifically abolished by Congress in 1966.222 The
would render an inquiry into constitutionality necessary. In one of the most famous
post-office cases, the Court explicitly disclaimed any inquiry into constitutional questions. American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 103, 111 (1902).
Nor could it be said in either of these cases that the administrator's action was "ultra
vires" in the sense in which that term was used in Larson.
220. That it is not utterly inconceivable is proved by the fact that several courts of
appeals have conceived of it, and have applied Larson to post-office cases without, of
course, any citation of Supreme Court post-office cases in support. See Summerfield
v. Parcel Post Assn., 280 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Sergeant v. Fudge, 238 F.2d 916
(6th Cir. 1956) (alternative holding), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957); Doehla Greeting
Cards, Inc. v. Summerfield, 227 F.2d 44 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Payne v. Fite, 184 F.2d 977
(5th Cir. 1950) (alternative holding). It is likely that these cases would have been decided as they were without resort to Larson, solely on the ground that the administrative action under challenge was within the scope of permissible discretion. See L.
JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcrION 229 n.122 (1965). Another case
disposed of on the basis of sovereign immunity and involving the Postmaster General
is Manhattan-Bronx Postal Union v. Gronouski, 350 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966). This case, however, might be described more appropriately
as a "government employment" case than a classic suit to review the post office's
performance of its distinctive administrative functions.
221. See, e.g., Elliott v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 137 (1836) (assumpsit against
federal customs collector for the Port of New York); Bend v. Hoyt, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.)
263 (1839) (same); Hardy v. Hoyt, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 292 (1839) (same); City of Philadelphia v. Collector, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 720 (1866) (assumpsit against collector of internal revenue); Barnes v. The Railroads, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 294 (1872) (trespass against
collector of internal revenue). Prior to the 1860's, almost all of the cases involving
federal taxes concerned duties upon imports or tonnage. Before the Civil War, internal
taxes were imposed by the federal government only during two brief periods-from
1791 to 1802 and from 1813 to 1817; and during those years they produced revenues
far less significant than those from customs duties. See L. DORIS, THE .AMERICAN WAY
IN TAXATION 16-18 (1963); U.S. TREASURY DEPT., THE WORK AND JURISDicrION OF nIE
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE 10-32 (1948).
222. Pub. L. No. 89-713, § 3(a), 80 Stat. nos 0956), codified as § 7422(£) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The cause of action against the collector has a
peculiar history which raises a definitional problem deserving some mention. In 1839,
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injunction against the District Director to prevent an improper
collection still survives today, 223 despite the existence, since 1867,
of a statute specifically forbidding it.224 Nonstatutory review in the
tax field is assuredly disappearing, as indeed it should, since statCongress enacted a law requiring customs collectors to pay all duties into the Treasury.
5 Stat. 339, 348 (1839). In 1845, the Supreme Court held, with Justices Story and
McLean dissenting, that this law had the effect of destroying the common-law action
against the collector, which had been based upon the collector's ability, once he had
been notified of the protest, to withhold payment over to his principal. Cary v. Curtis,
44 U.S. (3 How.) 236 (1845). Congress promptly remedied this unfortunate decision
by passing "an Act explanatory of [the 1839 statute]." That Act provided that "nothing
contained [in the 1839 statute] shall take away, or be construed to take away or
impair," the right of action against the collector, and it added to the elements of that
right of action the requirement that the protest against payment be in writing. 5
Stat. 727 (1845). See Curtis's Admx. v. Fiedler, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 461 (1862). Precisely
the same issue later confronted the Court with respect to internal revenue collections;
and the Court held, even without the benefit of an "explanatory Act," that the requirement of payment into the Treasury did not eliminate the cause of action against
the collector. The Court justified its apparent departure from the reasoning of Cary
v. Curtis, supra, by finding in other statutes the implication that the old right was
expected to continue. City of Philadelphia v. Collector, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 720 (1866).
Some cases and commentators consider these developments as having converted the
action against the collector from a common-law action to a statutory action. See, e.g.,
Plumb, Tax Refund Suits Against Collectors of Internal Revenue, 60 HARV. L, R.Ev.
685, 690-91 (1947), and cases cited therein at n.32. But see United States v. Nunnally
Inv. Co., 316 U.S. 258, 260, 263-64 (1942); United States v. Kales, 314 U.S. 186, 198-200
(1941); Lowe Bros. Co. v. United States, 304 US. 302, 306 (1938); Sage v. United States,
250 U.S. 33, 36-37 (1919). Presumably the authorities supporting that proposition
would maintain that, a fortiori, there has been a congressional waiver of sovereign
immunity with respect to such suits and that hence the refund suits against tax collectors could be said not to support the thesis of a "historical-prescription exception
to sovereign immunity" proposed in the text.
This controversy should be avoided since it is largely definitional. It might
be meaningful to consider as tantamount to a waiver of sovereign immunity
that type of "explicit acknowledgment" of the existence of a common-law cause
of action which occurred in the customs cases; but if such a waiver is also
found (as it was in the internal-revenue cases) in the mere "implicit acknowledgment" arising from the fact that Congress has established adjudicatory and
appellate procedures within the administrative structure on the assumption that
there is a particular common-law cause of action, then the thesis set forth in
the text has simply been rephrased. A long-standing tradition of nonstatutory
review in well-defined administrative fields inevitably arouses congressional reliance-or, if you will, "implicit acknowledgment." In the public-lands field, for
example, there is 30 U.S.C. § 226-2 (1964), discussed in text accompanying note 46
supra, establishing a period of limitation for seeking review of a denial of an oil
and gas lease by the Secretary of Interior. Indeed, such reliance is the very reason
that the exception to any new doctrine of sovereign immunity must be created. One
may, if he wishes, describe the outcome as an "implicit waiver" instead of an "historicalprescription exception," but the result is the same. In some cases, however, the congressional reliance may consist entirely of inaction, whereupon the "implicit waiver"
rationale becomes increasingly fictional. Consider, for example, the suits for injunction
against the collector, mentioned in text immediately following this footnote.
223. See Enochs v. Williams Packing 8c Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962); Allen v.
Regents of the Univ. System, 304 U.S. 439 (1938); Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co,,
283 U.S. 498 (1932); Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 550 (1959),
224. Act of March 2, 1867, ch, 169, § 10, 14 Stat. 475, now INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954,
§ 7421(a).
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utory review is now readily available; 225 but neither before nor
after Larson has the general doctrine of sovereign immunity had
anything to do with that disappearance.
The conceptual justification for the inapplicability of Larson to
certain classes of cases which seem squarely within its scope, can be
found in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which was providentially adopted in 1946, a few years before Larson was decided.226
Although the APA does not appear to be "jurisdictional" in the
sense that it waives sovereign immunity with respect to all the
matters which it covers,227 nevertheless even the most restrictive interpretation of the judicial-review section would acknowledgeindeed insist-that it was a "restatement of the existing law."228 But
as has been shown, in certain well-defined and prominent fields of
administrative activity, that "existing law" included the availability
of review without specific statutory authorization, even though the
action challenged was neither ultra vires nor unconstitutional, and
even though the suit by which review was sought was, all but nominally, against the United States. I£ that is so, then it seems that the
congressional "restatement" of 1946 took away the Supreme Court's
power to deny relief in such fields through subsequent judicial
revision of the principles of sovereign immunity. Whether or not
the legislative command that "[a]ny person suffering legal wrong
because of any agency action ... shall be entitled to judicial review
thereo£" 220 prevents the courts from raising any new obstacles to
suit in the traditional fields of nonstatutory review, surely it at
least prevents them from raising those new obstacles which are based
-as the doctrine of sovereign immunity is based-solely upon the
presumed absence of legislative consent. Hence, however much the
Court may alter its general criteria of sovereign immunity, the test
in traditional nonstatutory-review fields can be no more restrictive
than it was in the golden, permissive, pre-Larson days of 1946.
Although this analysis seems sound, and indeed is perhaps sug225. INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, §§ 7422, 7482. See United States ex rel. Girard Trust
Co. v. Helvering, !101 U.S. 540 (1937).
226. 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
227. For a discussion of this point, see the Appendix following this Article.
228. The Attorney General, who has never been particularly addicted to a broad
interpretation of the APA, maintained both prior to, and immediately after, its
passage that "the provisions of section 10 constitute a general restatement of the
principles of judicial review embodied in many statutes and judicial decisions."
ATrOllNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr 93 (1947) and
statements cited therein at n.l.
229. 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a) (1964).
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gested by the cases,280 I am reluctant to advance it without the accompanying observation that it provides a justification rather than a
reason. In fact, the tradition of judicial review of public-lands determinations would have continued even if the APA had not fortuitously been passed before, rather than after, Larson, and even if no other
satisfying conceptual justification could have been devised. The
day in which the broad abstraction of Larson, however frequently
affirmed, can suffice, APA or not, to destroy the vitality of a long
line of cases, factually cohesive among themselves and factually divergent from anything specifically considered in Larson itself-that
day, surely, will be the morning after the twilight of the common
law. Until then, it is not the historically consistent factual treatment, but rather the abstraction, which will be twisted into compliance or, if necessary, ignored. As was said quite simply in one
of the leading cases rejecting the claim of sovereign immunity in
the public-lands field:
Such decisions [of the Bureau of Land Management] have in fact been
reviewed by the courts for many years and long before the Administrative Procedure Act came into existence. This fact, in our view,
precludes any possible conclusion that they would fall into a nonreviewable category.2s1
Which leads, not inevitably but also not unnaturally, to a
concluding observation concerning the difficult role of the scholar
in the common-law system. If that system is to be worth all of the
trouble which it entails-most notably, the absurd and absurdly
increasing mass of published case precedent which must be sifted
by judges and advocates-and if it is to make good the boast that
its legal rules are hammered out on the anvil of reality, then the
common-law scholar, unlike his civil-law counterpart, must derive
his unifying principles from the case law instead of imposing them
upon it. By and large, American scholarship has faithfully attempted
to do this, wherefore the tedious footnotes which accompany the
standard law review article. But the task is not easy, and one of
its best-concealed pitfalls is revealed in the area of inquiry which
has been the subject of this· Article. Larson did not for a moment
230. See the last paragraph of the Appendix following this Article.
231. Adams v. Witmer, 271 F.2d 29, 34 (9th Cir. 1958). The statement was made
not in reply to the contention that sovereign' immunity barred the suit, but rather
to refute the argument that the administrative decision was, within the meaning of
the APA, "by law committed to agency discretion." Hence it cannot be interpreted as
a direct confirmation of the theory, set forth in the preceding paragraph of the text,
that the APA insulates from Larson those lines of nonstatutory review well established
in 1946.
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mislead federal appellate courts dealing with public-lands cases;
working always within the context of a particular set of facts, they
felt the pull of factually similar precedent. Scholars, on the other
hand, approaching the problem from the top rather than from the
bottom, and seeking to follow out a principle rather than to adjudicate a particular dispute, have often overlooked the distinctiveness of the public-lands cases and have discussed them together with
all the others which happen to fall within the broad conceptual category under investigation-"suits for specific relief against federal
officials.'' Certainly there is in principle nothing distinctive about
the public-lands cases. As far as a logical concept of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity is concerned, it should make no difference that
the defendant happens to be the Secretary of the Interior (Tallman)
rather than the War Assets Administrator (Larson), much less that
the suit against the Secretary of the Interior happens to seek a grant
of land (Tallman) rather than the return of land unlawfully seized
(Malone).
Thus, scholarly discussion of the application of sovereign immunity to suits against federal officials has tended to proceed at a
broad level of generality-close to the cases, but close to all the cases;
whereas the actual development of the law has to a large extent been
compartmentalized-into, for example, public-lands cases, post-office
cases, and tax cases. The resultant risk of distortion is twofold: The
court-made rules applicable to the general run of cases, such as the
theory of Larson, may be represented as applicable to certain sectors
where they in fact have no place; and at the other extreme, the
rationalizations devised in order that the rules may be avoided in
special sectors-such as the courts' facile use of the APA in publiclands cases to avoid Larson-may be represented as applicable to
the general run of cases, where they in fact have no place. What
scholars represent as the law has a tendency to become such, with
the result that the system retains all of the disadvantages of the
common law and yet derives a drastically reduced measure of that
pragmatic development which is supposed to be the common law's
major benefit. The problem, of course, is not peculiar to the area
which has been discussed in this Article. It is a general one, and
it is the inevitable effect, one suspects, of the wide distance between
the point of departure from which the common-law judge develops
his decision and that from which the scholar explains it.
The one remedy (and that far from fool-proof) is constant advertence to the fact that case law can be understood only in the manner
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in which it develops-not as a progression of judgments whose holdings concerning a particular principle, such as sovereign immunity,
are determined by the totality of other opinions on the subject,
but rather as containing a number of discrete, "existential" groupings of cases whose consistency among themselves is infinitely more
important to the public and to the courts, and must therefore be
more important to the scholars, than is their reconcilability with
the mass of decisions involving the general principle. The legal profession is keenly aware of this fact in some fields. No intelligent
commentator mixes FELA cases with the mass of agency cases, nor
desegregation cases with the rest of constitutional law, nor life
insurance cases with the rest of contracts. The truism behind such
selective exclusion-to wit, that the common law often grows into
existential, rather than conceptual, compartments-needs wider publicity.

APPENDIX
CONCERNING THE QUESTION WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT Is "JURISDICTIONAL" IN THE SENSE OF
CONSTITUTING

A WAIVER

OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Judicial and scholarly discussion of whether a particular statute
is "jurisdictional" often tends to confuse as much as it clarifies.
There appears to be some lack of realization that the statement "the
APA (or the Declaratory Judgment Act, or the Mandamus and Venue
Act of 1962) is jurisdictional" is as vague and uninformative, without
further specification, as is the statement that "the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York lacks jurisdiction."
The former, no less than the latter, leaves the reader to guess what
particular aspect of jurisdiction is at issue. It may be jurisdiction
over the subject matter, 232 or ordinary jurisdiction over the person,233 or that peculiar aspect of jurisdiction over the person in
suits against federal officials which constitutes the doctrine of sovereign immunity.234 It is not impossible, indeed it is quite ordinary, for a statute to be "jurisdictional" in one of these senses but
232. E.g., must the plaintiff meet the $10,000 requirement of federal-question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964) or is the dispute cognizable under some
other statute without regard to monetary amount?
233. E.g., is the Secretary of the Interior suable in a federal district court in California or, like most other defendants, only where he resides?
234. E.g., even though the Secretary of the Interior as an individual may be sued
in this court, is the nature of the suit such that the United States is also, in effect,
a party; and if so, has the court been given jurisdiction over it?
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in neither of the other two. To take the most obvious example, the
provision of the Judicial Code granting federal-question jurisdic•
tion235 neither confers jurisdiction over any particular person nor
waives the sovereign immunity of the United States when a federal
question is involved.236
Some statutes make it quite explicit that they are "jurisdictional"
both in the sense of granting subject matter jurisdiction and in the
sense of waiving sovereign immunity. For example, the Federal Tort
Claims Act287 was worded to provide that the United States district
courts "shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear, determine and render judgment on any claim against the United States [covered by the
Act]" and also that "the United States shall be liable in respect of
such claims in the same manner, and to the extent as a private individual under like circumstances." Other statutes, while making an
explicit grant only of subject matter jurisdiction, waive sovereign immunity by almost unavoidable implication, since the subject matter
grant would have no application without the waiver. For example,
section 1347 of the United States Code238 gives federal district courts
"original jurisdiction of any civil action commenced by any tenant
in common or joint tenant for the partition of lands where the
United States is one of the tenants in common or joint tenants." If
this provision were to be interpreted as a grant merely of subject
matter jurisdiction, thus excusing the plaintiff in such a case from
meeting the monetary requirements of the "federal-question" and
"diversity" bases, the effect would be to eliminate a relatively minor
obstacle to suits which are in any event absolutely barred by sover•
eign immunity. Clearly a waiver must be implied.239
The AP A is yet another step removed from a direct waiver of
sovereign immunity: not only does it, like the type of statute just
discussed, omit any explicit waiver; but it does not even contain
any explicit grant of subject matter jurisdiction from which such a
waiver might be implied. Professor Byse has argued persuasively
235. 28 u.s.c. § 1331 (1964).
236. See Maine v. United States, 134 F.2d 574 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 772
(1943) (46 U.S.C, § 781 waives sovereign immunity, but does not grant subject matter
jurisdiction); Harms v. FHA, 256 F. Supp. 757, 760-61 (D. Md. 1966) (12 U.S.C. § 1702
waives sovereign immunity, but does not grant subject matter jurisdiction; APA grants
subject matter jurisdiction).
237, 60 Stat. 842 (1946).
238. 28 u.s.c. § 1347 (1964).
239. For similar statutes, sec H.M. HART 8: H. '\\TECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM: 1140-44 (1953).
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that a grant of subject matter jurisdiction is implicit,240 at least now
that legislative purposes have been clarified by the Mandamus and
Venue Act of 1962.241 But it requires yet another step to establish
that waiver of sovereign immunity is also implied. Assuming that
one will not reject out of hand an implication from an implication,
there is nevertheless no real reason to make the second implication.
Unlike the example of section 1347 mentioned above, the AP A
would make sense as a grant of subject matter jurisdiction alone. It
would permit those many suits for judicial review which are not
barred by sovereign immunity to be entertained without the often
troublesome necessity of finding the monetary amount required for
"federal-question" jurisdiction.242
Of course, the more direct argument remains-that the APA constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity not because of an implication
from the newly manifest grant of subject matter jurisdiction which
it contains, but rather simply because provision of a waiver was the
original intent of the statute. The statute does, after all, state that
"any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action . . .
shall be entitled to judicial review thereof." 243 The legislative history, however, does not establish such an intent; and the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Act, which has now had more than
twenty years to develop, not only has not affirmed the existence of
waiver, but seems to have denied it. Although the Court stated the
proposition in terms more broad than was necessary, 244 the import of
its dictum in Blackmar v. Guerre245 is clear: "Certainly there is no
specific authorization in [the APA] for suit against the [United States
Civil Service] Commission as an entity. Still less is the Act to be
deemed an implied waiver of all governmental immunity from suit."
Since the enactment of the APA, the Court has upheld the defense
of sovereign immunity in a number of suits seeking specific relief
against federal officials-including not only Larson and Malone, but
also Dugan v. Rank,246 City of Fresno v. California,247 and Hawaii v.
240. Byse &: Fiocca, supra note 11, at 326-31.
241. 76 Stat. 744 [codified at 28 U,S.C. §§ 1361, 139l(e) (1964)].
242. See generally Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action:
The Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction,
and _Parties Defendant, 68 MICH. L. REv• .387, 436-48 (1970).
243. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
244. See 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 585 (1958),
245. 342 U.S. 512, 515-16 (1952).
246. 372 U.S. 609 (1963). 247. 372 U.S. 628 (1963).
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Gordon.248 In none of these cases did the Court think it necessary to
exclude the applicability of, or even to mention, the APA.
A number of federal courts of appeals have specifically held that
the APA does not embody a waiver of sovereign immunity.249 In
addition, there are many cases which support the same view by strong
implication, since they uphold the officials' defense of sovereign immunity without any reference whatever to the APA.250
Probably the best-knmrn and most frequently cited case which
holds, although with less than transparent clarity, that the APA
waives sovereign immunity is Adams v. Witner, 251 a public-lands
case. There are many other public-lands cases which, while making
no specific mention of sovereign immunity, use language to the effect that the court "has been granted jurisdiction to review under
the APA," 252 or simply describe the suit as one "under the APA."253
Arguably such references to the APA are intended to meet the objection of sovereign immunity as well as to satisfy the requirement
of subject matter jurisdiction. For all of these cases, however, an explanation exists which is more limited than the hypothesis that the
248. 373 U.S. 57 (1963).
249. Aktiebolaget Bofors v. United States, 194 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Ove Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete, 278 F.2d 912 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 894 (1960);
Local 542, Operating Engrs. v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 1964); Gnotta v. United
States, 415 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 38 U.S.L.W. 3338 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1970);
Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d 529
(8th Cir. 1967); White v. Administrator of Gen. Servs. Admn., 343 F.2d 444 (9th Cir.
1965); Motah v. United States, 402 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1968); Chournos v. United States,
335 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1964).
250. E.g., Switzerland Co. v. Udall, 337 F.2d 56 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
914 (1965); Leber v. Canal Zone Cent. Labor Union & Metal Trades Council, 383
F.2d lIO (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 104 (1968). A holding to the contrary
is contained in nvw v. Clark, 385 F.2d 687, 693-94 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 948 (1968). It is at best an alternative holding, since the opinion itself makes
it clear that "[f]irst amendment rights are at stake," which fact would of course call
into play one of the exceptions to Larson. 385 F.2d at 692. Moreover, the relegation of
the point to a footnote, the absence of any authority cited in support, and the very
manner of expression ("If consent to suit there must be consent to suit there here is."
385 F.2d at 694 n.10) lead one to feel that the holding is make-weight and is perhaps
deliberately intended as an offhand rebuff to the Government for its temerity in raising
such a defense in a "subversive-listing'' case. See also Mulry v. Driver, 366 F.2d 544,
547 (9th Cir. 1966) (technically dictum, since relief denied on other grounds; no
authority cited in support); Powelton Civic Home Owners Assn. v. Department of
Housing and Urban Dev., 284 F. Supp. 809, 834 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (alternative holding;
no supporting holding cited).
251. 271 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1958).
252. E.g., Heffelman v. Udall, 378 F.2d 109 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 926
(1967).
25!1. E.g., Pease v. Udall, !1!12 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1964); Foster v. Seaton, 271 F.2d 836
(D.C. Cir. 1959).
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APA constitutes a general waiver, and which would reconcile these
cases with what appears to be the overwhelming weight of judicial
opinion in other fields-namely, the theory advanced in this Article
that there must be acknowledged a separate rule for traditional
"nonstatutory review" cases.

